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MIT AND  NBER 
Growth,  Macroeconomics,  and 
Development* 
When  Keynes  solved "the  great puzzle of Effective  Demand,"  he made  it possible 
for economists once more to study the progress of society in long-run classical 
terms-with  a clear conscience. (Swan, 1956, p. 334) 
For most developing  countries,  in Africa and Latin America, the 1980s are 
known  as the lost decade;  for many it was a decade  of negative  growth. 
Developing  country  economic  policy  in the  1980s focused  on structural 
adjustment, a combination  of  macroeconomic  stabilization  measures  to 
restore domestic  and external equilibrium, and structural changes in poli- 
cies and institutions  designed  to make the economy  more efficient and 
flexible, and thereby increase growth  (World Bank, 1988, 1990a). 
As  the  decade  progressed,  and  the  consequences  of macroeconomic 
disequilibria became  clearer, development  economists  and practitioners 
increasingly  accepted  the  view  that  broad  macroeconomic  stability  is 
necessary  for sustained  growth.1  For instance,  at the  start of  the  new 
decade,  heavy  weight  has  to  be  placed  on  likely  macroeconomic- 
particularly  fiscal-developments  in  analyzing  growth  prospects  in 
countries  as diverse  as the  Soviet  Union,  India,  Turkey, Cote  d'Ivoire, 
and Brazil. 
The 1980s were also the decade in which macroeconomists  returned to 
growth  theory  and  turned  to  development.  The  new  growth  theory, 
starting with Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988), deals explicitly with devel- 
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1. See,  for instance,  Williamson  (1990), Fischer and Thomas  (1990), and the World  Develop- 
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opment,  seeking  to  account  for  the  apparent  nonconvergence  of  per 
capita income  levels  between  developing  and industrialized  countries.2 
A  hallmark  of  much  of  the  new  literature  is  the  demonstration  that 
distortions  and policy interventions  that can be shown  to affect the level 
of income in conventional  models  can affect the steady-state  growth rate 
in the new  models-thereby  providing  analytical backing for assertions 
that  had  routinely  been  made  by  development  economists.  Although 
existing  models,  such  as  the  Harrod-Domar  model3 or its multisector 
fixed coefficient extensions,  or the Solow model without the Inada condi- 
tion,4 also produce  such results,  it is clear that the new  growth theory is 
responsible  for  the  recent  interest  in  the  determinants  of  long-run 
growth  among  macroeconomists. 
The  new  growth  theory  has  also  returned  to  some  of  the  classic 
themes  of the development  literature, among  them the roles of technol- 
ogy,  international  trade,  human  capital,  economies  of  scale,  and  the 
possible  need  for a coordinated  big investment  push  to break out  of a 
low-income  equilibrium.5 
The empirical  work  associated  with  the  new  growth  theory  consists 
largely  of  cross-country  regressions,  typically  using  the  Summers- 
Heston  (1988) ICP data.6 Those  results  have  been  reviewed  and  their 
robustness  examined  in an extremely  useful  paper by Levine and Renelt 
(1990b); the strongest  results  are that investment  in physical  capital and 
either the level or the rate of change of human capital increase the rate of 
growth. 
The new  growth  theory  is production  function  driven  and primarily 
concerned  with  steady  states.  There has been  remarkably little focus on 
the  influence  of  macroeconomic  policies  on  growth;  for instance,  it is 
striking that measures  of political stability, but not macroeconomic  pol- 
icy,  have  been  included  in  new  growth  theory-based  regressions.7 
2. While  it is a convenient problem  on which to deploy the new theories,  their  aim is more 
ambitious  than to account for nonconvergence,  which can in any case be explained  in 
the Solow framework  (Mankiw,  Romer,  and Weil, 1990). 
3. Since a version of this model has been used as the standard model in World Bank 
country  analyses, many development  economists  had routinely  been assuming that the 
saving rate affects the growth rate. 
4. For the latter, see Solow (1956),  Jones and Manuelli (1990),  and Raut and Srinivasan 
(1991). 
5. See, for example, Romer  (1990),  Grossman  and Helpman (1990),  and Murphy,  Shleifer, 
and Vishny (1989). 
6. For  examples, see Barro  (1989a,b),  Mankiw,  Romer,  and Weil  (1990),  and Romer  (1989). 
7. Grier  and Tullock  (1989)  do include macroeconomic  variables  in cross-country  growth 
regressions, but their work is not inspired by the new growth theory,  taking  off rather 
from an earlier  paper by Kormendi  and Meguire  (1985).  Levine and Renelt  (1990b)  also 
include macroeconomic  variables in their growth regressions; so does De Gregorio 
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Swan's  (1956) excuse  for concentrating  on  the long  run-that  with  the 
help  of Keynes  we  know  how  to control short-run macro problems-is 
less  plausible  now  than it was  in the  1950s and 1960s, especially  for the 
developing  countries. 
The  aim  of  this  paper  is  firmly  to  establish-or  reestablish-that 
macroeconomic  policies  matter for economic  growth  and development. 
In Section  1 I discuss  the relationships  between  macroeconomic  policies 
and growth.  In Section  2 I present  several types  of evidence  suggesting 
that macroeconomic  policies  do  matter for growth:  that countries  that 
manage  short-run macroeconomic  policies better, tend to grow faster. In 
addition  to extending  the conventional  cross-country  regressions  to in- 
clude  macroeconomic  indicators,  I include  the  results  of pooled  time- 
series  cross-sectional  regressions  that  support  the  basic  findings.8  In 
Section  3 I present  and  discuss  evidence  on  the  mechanisms  through 
which  macroeconomic  policies  matter,  examining  whether  they  have 
any independent  influence  on growth,  or whether  instead  they operate 
almost  entirely  by affecting  investment.  In Section 4 I draw on the evi- 
dence  from major case  studies  to examine  and amplify  the conclusions 
on  macroeconomic  policy  drawn  from  the  previous  sections.  Conclu- 
sions  and issues  for future research are presented  in Section 5. 
1. Macroeconomic  Policies 
By macroeconomic  policies  I mean  monetary,  fiscal,  and exchange  rate 
policies  that help  determine  the rate of inflation,  the budget  deficit, and 
the balance of payments.  In particular, I will be examining partial correla- 
tions between  growth  and inflation and growth and the budget  deficit. I 
expect  that countries  that permit  high  inflation  rates and  large budget 
deficits grow more slowly. 
The potential  links  between  inflation  and  growth  are discussed  and 
developed  in Fischer (1983) and by implication in Fischer and Modigliani 
(1978). While  the  Mundell-Tobin  effect9 implies  that an increase  in ex- 
pected inflation increases  capital accumulation,  a variety of other mecha- 
run macroeconomic  management  and growth, and in attempting  to draw  policy  implica- 
tions from  the new growth theory,  has been made  by Vittorio  Corbo  and his associates  at 
the World  Bank;  see for instance  World  Bank  (1990a). 
8. Because  the focus of the paper  is on the role  of macroeconomic  policy,  I do not address  in 
any detail questions of alternative  development strategies-for  example, outward  ver- 
sus inward  orientation-that are frequently  analyzed  using cross-country  regressions  of 
the type that are presented in this paper. 
9. As noted in Fischer (1988), the mechanisms producing the Mundell and Tobin  effects 
actually  differ,  though both imply that an increase  in expected  inflation  increases  capital 
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nisms  produces  the opposite  correlation. The negative  effect of inflation 
on the efficiency  of the exchange  mechanism  suggests  that higher infla- 
tion reduces  the level  of income;  by extension  through  the new  growth 
theory  mechanisms,  this interaction  would  produce  a negative  relation 
between  inflation and growth.  Similarly, all the costs of inflation detailed 
in Fischer and Modigliani  (1978)-including  the impact of inflation on the 
taxation of capital-would  imply a negative  association between  the level 
of  income  and  inflation,  and  through  the  new  growth  theory  mecha- 
nisms,  between  inflation and growth.  This paper also discusses  the posi- 
tive association  between  the level and variability of the inflation rate, and 
the  likely  positive  association  between  inflation  and uncertainty  about 
future price levels.  This uncertainty  too is likely to reduce inflation. 
Probably as important as the above mechanisms  is the role of inflation 
as an indicator  of the  overall  ability of the  government  to manage  the 
economy.  Since  there  are  no  good  arguments  for  very  high  rates  of 
inflation,  a government  that is producing  high inflation is a government 
that  has  lost  control.  Economic  growth  is  likely  to be  low  in  such  an 
economy. 
This same  argument  is the main reason  to expect  a negative  associa- 
tion between  budget  deficits  and  growth.  Governments  that run large 
budget  deficits  are likewise  out of control.  In addition,  in many models 
budget  deficits crowd  out private investment. 
In the  short  run,  neither  the  inflation  rate nor  the  budget  deficit  is 
unaffected  by  the  growth  rate.  A  supply  shock  will  both  reduce  the 
growth rate and raise the inflation rate; and given government  spending 
a reduction  in growth  will increase the deficit. The length of time period 
in the regressions  in this paper is 15 years. The government  can certainly 
set  the  inflation  rate and  the  deficit  independently  of the  growth  rate 
over such a long  period. 
Nonetheless,  the possible  endogeneity  of monetary and fiscal policies 
has  to be  dealt  with.  That is  done  both  through  instrumental  variable 
estimation  and through  the case studies  presented  in Section 4. 
2. Cross-Sectional  Evidence 
Forty cross-sectional  growth  studies  published  since  1980 are listed  by 
Levine and Renelt (1990a).10  Each study regresses  the growth rate over a 
10. Their list is necessarily incomplete;  in particular,  it does not include the comparative 
cross-country  analysis by Morris  and Adelman (1988),  which is based on work dating 
back to the 1960s. Several other earlier  cross-country  studies are listed by Chenery 
(Chapter  2 in Chenery,  Robinson, and Syrquin, 1986, p. 27). Reynolds (1986,  p. 101) 
also presents a cross-sectional  growth regression, despite his general preference  for 
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given  period  against  a variety of variables; well  over 50 regressors  have 
been used in these studies  (Levine and Renelt, 1990b). Among  the regres- 
sors are variables relating to trade and trade policy, and exchange  rates, 
fiscal policy, political and  social stability and rights,  human  capital, and 
macroeconomic  policy  and  outcomes.  Early studies  tended  to focus  on 
trade policy  and  investment;  studies  associated  with  the  new  growth 
theory typically include  initial real income  and some  measure of human 
capital as well  as investment. 
For a sample  of 101 countries,  over the period  1960-1989,  Levine and 
Renelt (1990b) present  a basic regression 
GYP =  -  0.83  -  0.35 RGDP60  -  0.38 GN + 3.17 SEC +  17.5 INV 
(-0.98)  (-2.50)  (-1.73)  (2.46)  (6.53)  (1) 
R2 =  0.46;  t-statistics in parentheses, 
where  GYP is the growth  rate of real per capita income  (from the World 
Bank data base),  RDGP60 is (Summers-Heston)  real income in 1960, GN 
is the rate of population  growth,  SEC is the 1960 rate of secondary school 
enrollment,  and  INV  is  the  share  of  investment  in  GDP.  Applying 
Leamer's  extreme  bounds  analysis  to Equation (1), the robust relation- 
ships  are shown  to be  those  between  growth  and  initial income,  and 
between  growth  and investment.11 
They then  extend  the analysis  to include  a variety of other variables. 
Their two  broad  findings  are,  first,  that several  measures  of economic 
policy are related to long-run  growth; and second,  that the relationship 
between  growth  and  almost  every  particular macroeconomic  indicator 
other than the investment  ratio is fragile. 
There are two standard interpretations  of such regressions.  First, they 
can be interpreted  as attempts  to estimate  a time-differenced  production 
function  of the general form 
Yt = F[At, a( )Kt, b( )Ht]  (2) 
where  At is an overall  efficiency  factor, including  not  only  the  level  of 
technology,  but also for example  representing  the quality of government 
management  of the economy,  or institutional  factors; K and H are physi- 
cal and human  capital respectively;  and a( ) and b( ) are efficiency factors. 
Except for some  initial conditions,  the regressions  deal with averages of 
the  variables  over  long  periods,  treating  countries  as  the  population 
from which  the observations  are drawn. 
11. De Long and Summers  (1990) present  evidence  that growth  is linked  primarily to the 
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Differentiating  Equation (2), we can interpret the coefficients  in (1): 
GY = r71  A/A +  q2 (a/a + KIK) +  7q3  (bb  + H/H)  (3) 
where  r7,  is the elasticity with respect to argument i in Equation (1), and GY 
is the growth rate of aggregate output. The coefficient on investment  in (1) 
should  be  related  to  the  average  marginal  product  of capital over  the 
nearly three decades  represented  by each observation; this coefficient- 
which  is very robust-is  typically in the range of 10-20%.12  The negative 
coefficient  on population  growth  in (1) is (noisily) related to the growth 
rate of the unaugmented  stock of human capital, H; if population  growth 
were  equal  to  labor force  growth,  then  the  coefficient  on  labor in  an 
equation  for aggregate  growth  would  be 0.62. In any case,  Equation (1) 
suggests  that per capita income grows less rapidly the more rapidly popu- 
lation grows. 
An alternative interpretation  starts from the assumption  that the econ- 
omy is tending  toward  a steady-state  income  level,  Y*. The steady-state 
income  level is determined  by the rate of saving  (or investment),  invest- 
ment in human  capital, and the rate of population  growth.  Thus 
Y* = f(INV, SEC, GN). 
Then, given  some  initial level of income,  Y0,  and some final income level 
YT 
Y-  Yo =  (Y*-Y0)  (4) 
where 4 > 0 is related to the returns to scale properties of the underlying 
production  function  with  respect  to  the  variable factors.  If 4 <  1, the 
coefficient  on  Y0  in a regression  like (1) will be negative,  indicating con- 
vergence  of  income  levels  among  economies  with  the  same  rates  of 
investment,  human  capital, and population  growth. 
Equation (4) makes  clear the role of initial income  in Equation (1). An 
interpretation  of cross-country  regressions  based on Equation (3) has the 
benefit  of  not  requiring  that  the  economy  be  approaching  a  steady 
state-and  given  the fluctuations  seen in growth rates and income levels 
in many  developing  countries  in the period since 1970, it is hard to take 
the steady-state  interpretation  seriously.13 
12. However,  the  investment  coefficient  falls to 6% in some  regressions  in Barro (1989b) 
that also include  measures  of political instability. 
13. Despite  some  theoretical  papers  dealing  with  growth  among  open  economies,  e.g., 
Grossman  and  Helpman  (1990),  new  growth  theory  regressions  typically  treat each 
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Returning to regression  (1), the negative  coefficient on the initial level 
of real income  provides  evidence  of convergence;  it indicates  some  type 
of diminishing  returns for the production  function  expressed  in terms of 
per capita output.14 The variable SEC in (1) is included  as a proxy for the 
country's  ability to implement  technical  change; however,  the 1960 sec- 
ondary  school  enrollment  rate must  be  a noisy  measure  of a country's 
ability to implement  technical  change  over  the period  1960-1989.  Note 
further that since it is the rate of technical progress  rather than the level 
of technical  sophistication  that matters for growth,  we would  under the 
Equation (3) interpretation  expect some measure of the change in human 
capital to affect growth.15 
The range of RDGP60 is from 0.21 ($208) to 7.38 ($7380). The implica- 
tion is that the poorest  country in the group would  catch up in 142 years 
if it had the same secondary  school  enrollment  ratio [and other variables 
in (1)] as the richest country.16  A country starting at $1000 in 1960 would 
catch up in 90 years,  ceteris  paribus.  Initial real income  and  secondary 
school  enrollment  would  be strongly  negatively  correlated if social and 
religious  factors did not intervene;  probably these  two large coefficients 
between  them isolate a particular group of countries,  for example,  coun- 
tries  where  females  typically  did  not  receive  a  secondary  education, 
whose  growth  experience  differs from the average.17 
The significant  divergences  in economic  performance across countries 
that  underlie  regression  (1) are summarized  in  Table 1.18  The  growth 
rates are for GDP, with  countries  weighted  by their relative GDPs mea- 
14. As argued  by Romer  (1989),  measurement  error  in initial  income  will bias its coefficient 
to be negative (since positive measurement  error  in RGDP60  reduces the level of the 
dependent variable);  he also presents some evidence suggesting this problem  may be 
present. 
15. The change in enrollment is typically not included in growth regressions  because of 
mutual causation between it and the growth of income, and the unavailability  of 
instruments  to deal with that problem. However Romer  (1989)  shows that the coeffi- 
cients on both literacy  and the change in literacy  are significant  when instrumented 
using the consumption of newsprint and the number  of radios  per capita.  In this case 
initial  income becomes insignificant. 
16. This calculation  (1) assumes a growth rate difference  of 3.5%  per annum, and (2) does 
not present the confidence interval  around  the estimate. 
17. Levine and Renelt (1990b),  Table  1, show that the secondary  school enrollment  ratio 
becomes insignificant  if an Africa dummy is included; De Gregorio  (1991)  finds that 
school enrollment (primary  or secondary) is insignificant  in growth regressions for 
Latin  America  alone. 
18. The similarities  of experiences across countries within regions call for explanations; 
among them must be the common influence of particular  industrialized  country  part- 
ners (e.g., Japan  in Asia, the United States for Latin  America),  similarities  of historical 
experiences, and learning from neighbors. There are of course also real differences 
among countries  within a region, for instance, the development  strategies  and growth 
performance  of Kenya  and Tanzania,  or Korea  and India, differ  greatly. Table 1  SUMMARY STATISTICS, BY REGION 
Africa  Asia  Latin Americaa 
60-73  73-80  80-88  60-73  73-80  80-88  60-73  73-80  80-88 
GDP growth  rate  4.5  3.2  0.3  5.6  5.7  7.8  6.0  5.1  1.2 
Popn.  growth  rate  2.6  2.8  3.2  2.4  1.9  1.7  2.7  2.4  2.2 
Inflation  5.8  14.1  25.7  2.0  6.0  6.9  5.7  24.1  111.2 
Budget deficit/GDP  6.3  3.9  3.7  2.4  2.0  5.5 
Real exchange  rate  82.6  98.6  64.7  90.3  83.0  91.9 
Current account/GDP  -3.6  -3.4  -6.1  -1.7  -1.1  -0.8  -2.6  -3.1  -2.4 
Export growth  (real)  7.0  4.4  -1.9  5.2  8.0  13.0  5.4  3.0  5.5 
I/GDP (real)  14.0  21.5  15.6  19.4  26.5  30.1  18.9  23.5  18.6 
External debt/XGS  96.6  365.0  89.8  98.9  196.2  316.6 
aLatin America and  Caribbean. 
Note: Growth  rates  are  percent  per  annum;  inflation  rate,  of  GDP  deflator,  is  calculated  on  a continuous  (logarithmic)  basis;  all  ratios  are expressed  as 
percentages; base year for all indices  is 1980; increase  in exchange  rate index indicates  devaluation;  external debtlXGS  (exports  of goods  and services)  ratios  are 
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sured  in  dollars  in  1980. Over  the period  since  1960, economic  growth 
has accelerated in Asia while  slowing  in Latin America and Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA); the  slowdown  in the  1980s was  greater in Latin America 
than in Africa,  even  when  measured  on  the basis  of the growth  of per 
capita GDP. 
The association  between  growth  and investment  in Table 1 is broadly 
positive,  across  both  time  and  regions.  However,  in each  region  there 
was  a sharp  increase  in  the  rate of  investment  between  the  first two 
periods  without  an  increase  in  the  growth  rate.19 Inflation  increased 
between  periods  in each region,  but the increases  were much greater in 
SSA and particularly in Latin America than in Asia; there is a predomi- 
nantly  negative  relationship  between  inflation  and  growth  in Table 1. 
However,  low  growth  Africa has generally  not had the very high  infla- 
tion  rates  of  Latin America;  in  part this  is because  the  fixed  exchange 
rate among  the  Francophone  countries  belonging  to the  franc zone  in 
Africa (CFA zone)  has been  maintained  throughout.  The negative  rela- 
tionship  between  growth  and  inflation  is prima facie evidence  that the 
quality of macroeconomic  management  affects growth.  Supporting  evi- 
dence  comes  from the apparently  negative  relationship  between  growth 
and the increase  in the size of the budget  deficit, although  here data for 
SSA are incomplete. 
The data suggest,  but only  weakly,  that countries  that grow faster do 
better on the current account  of the.balance  of payments;  the weakness 
of  the  association  derives  in  part  from  variations  in  the  tightness  of 
constraints  on  borrowing.  The  association  between  the  growth  of  ex- 
ports and  GDP growth  is striking: rapid growth  in Asia in the  1980s is 
associated  with  an  extremely  rapid  rate of  export  growth,  which  can 
with further disaggregation  be tracked down not only to the newly indus- 
trialized  economies  (NIEs),  but  also  to  the  increase  in  exports  from 
China  during  its  growth  spurt  in the  1980s. The relationship  between 
export and GDP growth  supports  the argument that outward orientation 
is a route to growth.20 Each region  shows  depreciation  of the exchange 
rate in the 1980s relative to the 1970s; but it is striking that the deprecia- 
19. The  inverse  of  the  incremental  capital-output  ratio  (ICOR) is  frequently  used  as  a 
measure  of the efficiency  of investment,  but because  of depreciation  is seriously  biased 
for this purpose.  Conventionally  measured  ICOR is (I/Y)/(AY/Y). "True" ICOR, desig- 
nated ICOR*, is equal to (AK/Y)/(AY/Y).  Let 8 be the rate of depreciation,  and g  AY/Y 
the growth  rate. Then ICOR =  ICOR* +  (8/g)(K/Y). Measured ICOR exceeds  ICOR*  by 
an amount  that is inversely  related  to the rate of growth.  Accordingly  the inverse  of 
measured  ICOR tends  to be  higher  the  more  rapid  the  growth  rate. This argument 
would  have  to be modified  to take account of the nonhomogeneity  of capital. 
20. Although  there is much evidence  that outward  orientation is positively  associated  with 
growth,  as noted  above  I will not pursue  that relationship  in this paper. 338 *  FISCHER 
tion  was  greatest  in Asia.  Nominal  devaluations  were  greater in other 
regions,  but their real impact was  not maintained  as well as in Asia. 
Table 1 is suggestive  of the role that macroeconomic  factors and policy 
may  play  in  determining  aggregate  performance.  Further  evidence 
comes  from  Table 2,  reproduced  from  Levine  and  Renelt  (1990b). The 
black market exchange  rate premium  is the average  premium  over  the 
official exchange  rate,  as  measured  from Pick's Currency Yearbook.  The 
black market premium  is an indicator of the extent  of trade distortions, 
capital controls,  and expectations  of devaluation,  and must be correlated 
with the degree  of overvaluation  of the currency. 
Dervis  and  Petri (1987) obtain  similar  results,  based  on  the  growth 
performance  of 20 middle-income  developing  countries.  They show  that 
countries  that grow  faster than average  tend  to invest  more than aver- 
age,  have  smaller current account deficits,  have lower shares of govern- 
ment spending,  and had more rapid export growth than other countries. 
The rapid growers  did  not  have  particularly small budget  deficits,  and 
the  extent  of  their real depreciations  and  terms  of trade changes  were 
average. 
Indicators of macroeconomic  performance enter cross-sectional  regres- 
sions with  significant  coefficients.  Regressing  per capita real (Summers- 
Heston)  growth  over  the  period  1970-198521 against  the  standard  new 
growth  theory  variables,  plus  indicators  of  macroeconomic  perfor- 
mance,  yields 
GY =  1.38 -  0.52 RGDP70 +  2.51 PRIM70 +  11.16 INV -  4.75 INF  (5) 
(1.75)  (-5.90)  (2.69)  (3.91)  (-2.70) 
+  0.17 SUR -  0.33 DEBT80 -  2.02 SSA -  1.98 LAC 
(4.34)  (-0.79)  (-3.71)  (-3.76) 
R2 =  0.60,  n =  73,  t-statistics in parentheses, 
where  PRIM70 is  the  enrollment  rate  for  primary  school,  INF is  the 
average  inflation  rate over the period  1970-1985,  SUR is the ratio of the 
budget  surplus  to GNP over the period 1975-1980,22 DEBT is the foreign 
debt to GNP ratio in 1980, and SSA and LAC are sub-Saharan Africa, and 
21. The period was chosen in a trade-off  between the length of period and number of 
macroeconomic  variables  that could be included in the regression. 
22. The period  is chosen to increase  the number  of countries  included  in the sample. I have 
also run similar  regressions  for the period  1974-1989,  using Levine  and Renelt's  (1990b) 
data, provided by Ross Levine. No major  differences  in conclusions  emerge using the 
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Table 2  COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS, BY GROWTH RATE (1960-1989) 
Characteristic  Fast growers  Slow growers  t-statistic 
Investment/GDP  0.23  0.17  5.18 
Govt. C/GDP  0.16  0.12  3.26 
Exports/GDP  0.32  0.23  2.31 
Inflation rate  12.34  31.13  -1.74 
Black market E.R. premiuma  13.57  57.15  -3.79 
Secondary  enrollment  (1960)  0.30  0.10  5.46 
Primary enrollment  (1960)  0.90  0.54  6.10 
aAverage  black  market  exchange  rate  premium. 
Source:  Levine and Renelt (1990b,  Table  2). Sample consists of 109 countries;  fast growers are the 56 
countries  whose growth  rate  of per capita  income  exceeds  the mean;  slow growers  are the remaining  53 
countries. 
Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  dummies,  respectively.  The  sample 
includes  all countries  for which  data  were  available.23 
The  rates  of  investment  and  inflation,  and  the  budget  surplus  enter 
regression  (5)  significantly.  The  signs  of  all  variables  are  as  expected. 
When  the  continent  dummies  are  excluded,24  the  coefficient  on  inflation 
and  the  debt  rise.25  Recalling  that  several  of  the  mechanisms  relating 
inflation  to  growth  that  were  discussed  in  Section  1 operate  by  affecting 
investment,  it should  be  noted  that  the  coefficients  on  both  inflation  and 
investment  in  Equation  (5)  are  statistically  significant.  This  implies  that 
inflation  has  effects  other  than  those  that  operate  through  investment. 
For  instance,  inflation  could  affect  the  efficiency  of  operation  of  the 
given  factor  inputs.  Regression  (5) strengthens  the  argument  that  macro- 
23. It can be argued  that the developing countries  are sufficiently  and systematically  differ- 
ent from  the industrialized  countries  that the latter  should be excluded  from  the regres- 
sions. While it is easy to agree with this view at the extremes,  it is hard  to know where 
to draw the line, and I therefore  worked  mostly with all countries  for which there  were 
data. For  some regressions  (not reported  here), I excluded  all countries  that  in 1970  had 
an income level above Italy's;  if anything, this gave stronger  results with respect to 
macroeconomic  variables,  particularly  for debt. 
24. Continent  dummies enter most growth equations significantly.  Lance  Taylor  has sug- 
gested that the negative coefficients for Africa and Latin America may reflect their 
particularly  adverse terms of trade  shocks in the 1980s. 
25. There  was relatively  little  experimentation  in arriving  at Equation  (5). In some versions, 
the variance  of inflation  was entered along with the rate  of inflation;  it was not signifi- 
cant and was  excluded because it is  highly correlated with the rate of inflation 
(R=0.94). The SEC70  variable  was initially  included but was dropped since its exclu- 
sion made little difference  and since PRIM70  was generally  more significant.  The bud- 
get surplus variable  is available  for the period 1975-1985  for a smaller  sample of (56) 
countries;  the t-statistic  on the budget surplus is smaller  in that sample, but the coeffi- 
cient is still significant  at the 5%  level. However in those regressions  the significance 
level on the inflation  rate  drops below 5%,  while that  on the debt rises. The inclusion  of 
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economic  indicators  are correlated with  growth,  at least over the period 
1970-1985.26 
As  discussed  in Section  1, the macroeconomic  indicators  included  in 
(5) cannot be regarded  as truly exogenous.  In this respect their status is 
no different than that of investment.  Instruments  are difficult to find; for 
instance,  such  candidates  as  measures  of  political  instability  not  only 
cause but also are caused  by inflation.  Instrumental  variable estimation 
of  Equation  (5) using  as  instruments  initial  GDP  and  primary enroll- 
ment,  the  frequency  of crises  and riots,  military spending,  foreign  aid, 
and the debt in 1980 resulted  in a regression  in which  no coefficient was 
significantly  different  from zero.  Instrumental  variable regression  using 
the  above  instruments  plus  the  variance  of inflation,  the  frequency  of 
constitutional  changes,  and  government  consumption  spending  pro- 
duced  results  very  similar to (5), except  that primary education  lost its 
statistical significance. 
The  instrumental  variables  regression,  which  does  not  include  the 
continent  dummies,  is 
GY =  0.55 -  0.33 RGDP70 + 2.32 PRIM70 +  12.79 INV -  7.10 INF  (6) 
(0.28)  (-4.33)  (1.31)  (3.51)  (-4.45) 
+  0.28 SUR -  0.03 DEBT80 
(3.06)  (-0.04) 
R2 = 0.41,  n =  54,  t-statistics  [with White (1980) correction] in paren- 
theses. 
Given both the similarity between  Equations (5) and (6), and the difficul- 
ties of choosing  instruments,  I will focus in the remainder of this section 
on Equation (5). 
Relatively  little  of  the  cross-sectional  variance  in  growth  rates is ac- 
counted  for by the macroeconomic  variables alone.  When only the infla- 
tion  rate,  debt,  and  the  deficit  are  included,  the  (corrected)  squared 
correlation  coefficient  is  only  0.16.  When  the  continent  dummies  are 
added,  32% of the variance is accounted  for. 
Table 3 presents  the correlation matrix of the variables in (5), as well as 
their means  and ranges.  Several of the simple correlations are of interest: 
the simple correlation between  investment  and growth is high; the corre- 
26. Regressions  in Dervis  and Petri (1987) show  that the macroeconomic  variables are less 
significant  in cross-country  regressions  for the period 1960-1973 than subsequently.  As 
suggested  by  the  discussant  of that paper,  Arnold  Harberger, this may be a result of 
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Table 3  MEANS,  RANGES, AND  CORRELATIONS OF VARIABLESa 
GY  RGDP70  PRIM70  INV  INF  SUR  DEBT80 
Mean  1.76  2.99  0.87  0.20  0.14  -0.05  0.19 
Max  8.21  9.46  1.29  0.39  0.39  0.01  2.02 
Min  -4.15  0.27  0.13  0.05  0.05  -0.18  0.00 
RGDP70  0.11 
PRIM70  0.38  0.55 
INV  0.46  0.55  0.54 
INF  -0.35  -0.21  0.04  -0.29 
SUR  0.25  0.19  0.14  -0.09  0.05 
DEBT80  -0.23  -0.27  -0.16  -0.06  0.15  -0.33 
SSA  -0.37  -0.48  -0.54  -0.39  0.10  -0.09  0.19 
LAC  -0.23  -0.12  0.16  -0.15  0.28  0.07  0.14 
aGY,  INV, INF  are for the period 1970-1985;  RGDP70,  PRIM70,  and DEBT80  are  for the specified  dates; 
SUR  is the average  budget surplus over the period 1975-1980.  Correlation  coefficients  that exceed 0.23 
are significant  at the 5%  level. 
lation  between  the  primary  school  enrollment  rate  and  the  share  of 
investment  in GDP is high; the correlation between  the budget  surplus 
and  inflation  is  nonnegative;  the  correlation  between  investment  and 
inflation is negative;  that between  external debt and the budget  surplus 
is  negative.  Because  investment  levels  in  Latin America  are relatively 
high,  the debt-investment  correlation is low.27 
The  external  debt  to  GNP  ratio serves  in  (5) as  an  indicator  of  the 
exchange  rate overvaluations  of the late 1970s. The average black market 
foreign  exchange  premium  could  serve as another such  (partial) indica- 
tor, and  Table 2  suggests  it might  be  strongly  related  to  growth.  The 
simple  correlation  between  the  average  growth  rate  over  the  period 
1970-1985  and the average  black market premium  for the same period, 
for a group of 40 countries  for which  the data are available, is -0.24.  The 
simple  correlation between  the premium  and investment  is  -0.36,  and 
between  the  premium  and  the  budget  surplus  -0.34.28  However,  the 
coefficient  on  the average  black market premium  is never  significant  in 
27. The simple correlations  among the nondummy variables  in Table  3 are sensitive to the 
inclusion of the high-income  countries.  For  instance, debt and income are more nega- 
tively correlated  in Table  3 than they are in the same sample excluding  industrialized 
countries. 
28. The premium  is available  for 67 countries  for the period 1970-1985,  but there are only 
40 countries  for which the variables  in Equation  (5) plus the premium  are all available. 
The weakness of the simple correlation  between growth  and the black  market  premium 
may be a result  of the wide range of the premium,  from  zero to an average  of 717%  (for 
Nicaragua).  The premium is high for African  countries, excluding those in the CFA 
zone, and for Latin  America.  Nicaragua  aside, the highest premia, frequently  exceed- 
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any  regression  that  includes  the  other  macroeconomic  variables,  and 
this applies  also  to various  nonlinear  transformations  of the premium. 
Its major impact  seems  to be  to reduce  the  coefficient  on  the  external 
debt,  but because  its inclusion  also  changes  the sample  size,  not much 
can be deduced  from any such  effect.  We return to the role of the black 
market premium  in Section 3. 
Cross-sectional  regressions  such  as (5) ignore  information  that might 
be available  in  the  time  series  of data within  each  country.  Running  a 
pooled  cross-section  time-series  regression  of the general form of (5), for 
the period  1972-1985,  and including  lagged  as well  as current values  of 
the rates of investment  and inflation,  we obtain 
GYit  =  Year  Dummies -  0.23 RGDP70i +  1.40 PRIM70i + 36.5 INVit  (7) 
(-2.82)  (1.64)  (5.53) 
-3.83  INVit  1) -19.9  INVi,t2)  -  3.55 INFit 
(-0.49)  (-4.27)  (-3.19) 
+  2.22 INFi(t_l)  -  2.08 DEBT80i + 4.30 SURit 
(2.55)  (-2.26)  (1.13) 
R2 =  0.207,  n=1059,  t-statistics in parentheses. 
Investment  variables  retain  their  strong  statistical  significance  in  the 
pooled  regression,  which  also gives  some  evidence  on the dynamics  of 
the relation between  output  and  investment.  The large contemporane- 
ous  coefficient,  36.5  (percent),  must  represent  primarily  the  demand 
effect in which  an increase  in investment  demand  causes  a more rapid 
increase  in output.  The coefficients  on the investment  rates can also be 
expressed  in the form (12.8 INVit + 23.7 AINVit  + 19.9 AINVi(t_i)),  suggest- 
ing that increases  in the investment  ratio have  a large temporary effect 
on  growth,  which  can  be  associated  with  the  demand  effect,  leaving 
12.8%  as  the  estimate  of  the  longer-term  impact  of  investment  on 
growth. 
Both the  regression  evidence  presented  in this  section  and  the  data 
presented  in Tables 1 and 2 demonstrate  the existence of suggestive  corre- 
lations between  macroeconomic  policy-related variables and growth over 
periods  as  long  as  15 years.  The  evidence  supports  the  view  that the 
quality of macroeconomic  management,  reflected in these regressions  in 
the inflation rate, the external debt ratio, and the budget surplus, matters 
for growth. 
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macroeconomic  indicators  are most  robustly  associated  with  growth  in 
the  cross-country  regressions.  However,  that exercise  is unlikely  to be 
instructive,  as the results of Levine and Renelt (1990b) show. There are at 
least  two  reasons  for this.  First, none  of  the  standard  indicators-the 
budget  surplus,  the current account,  the inflation rate, the real exchange 
rate-is  truly exogenous  with  respect  to growth.  Nor is the instrument 
problem  readily  soluble.  Second,  cross-country  regressions  such  as (5) 
have no clear structural interpretation.  While they are very useful  ways 
of summarizing  the correlations in the data, and they suggest  that coun- 
tries that manage  the  macroeconomy  will  grow  faster, they  do  not  ex- 
plain how. 
3. Why  Do Macroeconomic  Variables  Matter? 
Suppose  we accept the argument that inflation and other factors related to 
short-run macroeconomic  management  affect economic growth.  In terms 
of the production  function  (1), there are two possible  routes of influence. 
First, macroeconomic  management  may affect the rate of investment,  and 
thus  the  rate of change  of K.29  For example,  large budget  deficits  may 
crowd out physical  investment;  or high and uncertain inflation may both 
reduce investment  and induce  capital flight. In addition,  macroeconomic 
factors  may  affect  the  efficiency  with  which  factors are used,  i.e.,  by 
affecting A(),  a(),  and b( ) in Equation (1): for instance,  by distorting price 
signals,  inflation may reduce the rate of return on physical investment;  or 
inflation may produce  distortions  that reduce the real wage. 
New  growth  theory-based  cross  country  investment  regressions  are 
presented  in  Barro (1989a,b)  and  Romer  (1989),  and  their  robustness 
examined  in  Levine  and  Renelt  (1990b).  These  regressions  generally 
show  that some  measure  of initial human  capital has a positive  impact 
on  investment,  that  measures  of political  instability  have  negative  im- 
pacts,  that  investment  is  higher  the  lower  the  relative  price of invest- 
ment  goods,  and the more the price of investment  goods  diverges  from 
the world level.  In addition,  government  investment  appears to be com- 
plementary  with private investment.  The robustness  tests by Levine and 
Renelt (1990b) show  that none  of the relationships  in the basic regression 
equation-which  does  not  include  the  relative  price  of  investment 
goods-is  robust:  the  cross-sectional  results  provide  little guidance  on 
the determinants  of investment. 
Table 4 presents  estimates  of a number  of cross-sectional  investment 
29. Short-term  macroeconomic  management  will also affect the number  of employed,  H, 
but is less likely to affect the rate of growth  of population  over long periods. 344 *  FISCHER 
Table  4  CROSS-COUNTRY  INVESTMENT  REGRESSIONSa 
Equation 




















































































aDependent  variable  is INV, average share of investment in GNP over the period 1970-1985,  in the 
Summers-Heston data. BLAV  is the average  black  market  premium  (as a multiple  of the offical  rate) 
over the period 1970-1985;  PINV  is the average  price  of investment  goods in the country  (relative  to the 
United  States)  over the period;  other variables  are as in Table  3. 
regressions,  all for  the  average  share  of  investment  in  GNP  over  the 
period  1970-1985. 
Equation (8) in Table 4 is both simple and has the highest  explanatory 
power  for  cross-country  variation  in  investment.  There  are  no  clear 
causal reasons  that the initial level  of per capita GDP and school  enroll- 
ment enter the equation.  The significant  coefficient on the growth rate is 
consistent  with the typical finding  that accelerator type investment  func- 
tions perform well  (Clark, 1979). However,  the direction of causation  in 
this equation  is difficult to establish.30 
30. Of course,  the same  can be said for the cross-country  growth  regressions  that include 
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When  the macroeconomic  variables are added  and the growth  rate of 
output  removed,  inflation  and the budget  surplus are significantly  nega- 
tively related to investment.  The negative  relationship between  inflation 
and  the  share  of investment  is robust.  Equations  (10) and  (11) suggest 
important  interactions  between  the initial level  of outcome  and primary 
enrollment,  and  the  SSA continent  dummy.31 Finally, in Equation (12), 
we  see  strongly  statistically  significant  coefficients  on the black market 
premium  (BLAV) and  the relative price of investment  goods;  the inclu- 
sion  of  these  variables  leaves  the  budget  surplus  as  the  other  macro- 
economic  variable that is significant  at the 5% level,  but in the a priori 
wrong  direction,  if the surplus  is interpreted  as a measure  of the quality 
of macroeconomic  measurement,  or if deficits are thought  to crowd out 
investment.32 
The relationship  between  the investment  share and the black market 
premium  is reasonably  robust,  in the  sense  that the black market pre- 
mium remains large and statistically significant in most permutations  of 
investment  equations  that  are based  on  the  40-country  sample.33 The 
coefficients  on  the  other  macroeconomic  variable  are not  stable.  The 
coefficient  on  the  debt  is  typically  not  significant,  and  it is  frequently 
(though  not  significantly)  positive,  implying  that  countries  that  bor- 
rowed  more in the 1970s generally  invested  more, ceteris paribus. 
The black market premium  can be interpreted  both  as a measure  of 
expectations  of depreciation  of the currency (and therefore  also of cur- 
rency overvaluation),  and  as a crude index  of distortions.  Expectations 
of depreciation  may affect investment  through  several channels:  first, it 
is  more  attractive  to  hold  foreign  assets  when  depreciation  is  ex- 
pected34; second,  economic  uncertainty  is  higher  under  such  condi- 
tions;  but  third,  for  those  who  can  obtain  foreign  exchange  at  the 
official rate,  foreign  capital goods  are cheap  to import.  While  the  first 
two  factors  suggest  a negative  relationship  between  the  black market 
premium  and  investment,  the  third  suggests  the  opposite.  To the  ex- 
tent  that  the  black  market  premium  serves  as  a general  index  of  dis- 
31. It can be seen  from Table 3 that the simple  correlations between  the SSA dummy  and 
PRIM70 and RGDP70 are high. 
32. Sweder  van  Wijnbergen  has  suggested  that  the  negative  coefficient  on  the  budget 
surplus may reflect the role of government  investment,  which increases the overall rate 
of  investment  but  decreases  the  budget  surplus.  The  coefficient  on  the  surplus  is 
reduced  when  the  dependent  variable becomes  private rather than aggregate  invest- 
ment,  but it does  not become  positive. 
33. Solimano  (1989) finds,  using  quarterly data from 1977:1  to 1987:IV,  that the black market 
premium  is strongly  negatively  associated  with investment  in Chile. 
34. This assumes  domestic  interest  rates have  not adjusted,  which  is implied  by the pres- 
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tortions  and  therefore  of  an  unsustainable  situation,  it is  likely  to  be 
negatively  correlated with  investment. 
The black market premium  is both strongly negatively  correlated with 
investment,  and in Section 2 does  not appear to affect the rate of growth 
significantly.  The  explanation  would  seem  to be  simple:  that the black 
market premium  affects the rate of investment  directly and thereby the 
rate  of  growth  indirectly.  In  terms  of  Equation  (5),  the  black  market 
premium  can be interpreted  as affecting  the rate of investment  but not 
the efficiency  of investment. 
Unfortunately,  this  argument  does  not  stand  up  to further examina- 
tion.  A  priori,  it is  difficult  to  see  why  an index  of  distortions  would 
affect the  rate of investment  but not  the  rate of return on  investment. 
More important,  there is direct evidence  that the black market premium 
is  correlated  with  the  efficiency  of  investment.  Table 5  presents  esti- 
mated  rates  of  return  on  investment  projects  in developing  countries, 
cross-categorized  against  measures  of  distortions  and  macroeconomic 
variables including  the real interest rate, the black market premium,  and 
the inflation rate.35 
The interpretation  of the role of the black market premium must there- 
fore be left as something  of a mystery: it is negatively  associated with the 
rate  of  investment;  it  is  not  clearly  associated  with  the  growth  rate, 
except  perhaps  in  extreme  cases;36 but  there  is  direct evidence  that it 
appears to affect the rate of return on investment.  Whether these results 
can be explained  by the relationship  between  the black market premium 
and other measures  of macroeconomic  policy  or microeconomic  distor- 
tions remains  to be seen. 
Although  none  of  the  regressions  in  Table 4 presents  a satisfactory 
account of the determination  of investment,  this evidence  as well as that 
in Levine and Renelt (1990b) again shows  that macroeconomic variables- 
particularly the black market premium and inflation-affect  investment. 
But because  the  relationships  between  investment  and macroeconomic 
indicators, except the black market premium and, to a lesser extent, infla- 
tion, are not robust,  it is unlikely  that further cross-sectional  regressions 
35. The data are from Kaufmann  (1991); Kaufmann's  preliminary regressions  suggest  that 
the black market premium  is the main macroeconomic  variable that affects project rates 
of  return.  This  presumably  means  that  it  is  the  best  summary  indicator  of  macro- 
economic  distortions. 
36. The qualifier is based  on  results  reported  in Chapter 2 of the  1991 World  Development 
Report. In  that  study  rates  of  total  factor  productivity  growth  for 68  countries  are 
regressed  against  several  variables,  including  the  black  market  premium,  which  is 
interpreted  as  a  measure  of  macroeconomic  instability.  The  authors  find  that  TFP 
growth  is significantly  lower for countries  for which  the lagged black market premium 
exceeded  500%, but that total factor productivity  growth  was otherwise  unaffected  by 
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Table 5  RATES OF RETURN ON INVESTMENT PROJECTSa 
Public sector  Private sector 
Black market premium 
High (>  200%)  4.5  11 
Medium  (20-200%)  8.4 
Low (<  20%)  12.2  14.7 
Real interest rate 
Negative  8.7  10.9 
Positive  12.6  16.0 
Inflation rate 
High (>  100%)  6.5  139 
Medium  (20-100%)  7.9 
Low (<  20%)  11.2  13.5 
Trade price distortions 
High  8.9  9.4 
Low  11.7  16.1 
aFrom  Kaufmann  (1991):  rates  of return  on public  sector  projects  based  on a sample  of estimated  ex post 
rates  of return  on 1400  World  Bank  projects;  private  sector  projects  are IFC  financed,  and their  rate  of 
return  is the so-called  reappraisal  rate of return,  which differs  from  the ex post rate  of return;  sample 
size is 150. All data  are preliminary. 
of this  type  will  pin  down  the  transmission  mechanism  between  macro- 
economic  variables  and  growth. 
Time  series  evidence  for  individual  countries  may  help  do  so.  For the 
industrialized  economies,  investment  equations  generally  show  invest- 
ment  being  affected  by  the  cost  of  capital  and  by  demand  variables.  The 
theoretical  literature  has  emphasized  the  option  value  of  waiting  as  a 
factor  that  makes  investment  especially  sensitive  to  uncertainty;  quan- 
tity  of credit  impacts  have  also  been  identified.37 
The  same  variables  that  affect  investment  in  industrialized  countries 
should  also  affect  investment  in  developing  countries.38  In  addition, 
foreign  exchange  and  credit  rationing  may  be more  prevalent  in develop- 
ing  countries.  Investment  equations  for  developing  countries  have  also 
paid  considerable  attention  to  possible  complementarities  between  pub- 
lic  and  private  sector  investment.39  Rama  (1990)  summarizes  the  results 
37. On irreversible  investment and the value of waiting, see Bernanke  (1983)  and Pindyck 
(1988);  on finance and investment, see, for example, Fazzari,  Hubbard,  and Petersen 
(1988). 
38. Serven and Solimano (1989)  survey theories and evidence on investment, particularly 
with respect to the implications  for developing countries. 
39. This issue is also examined in Barro  (1989a),  who finds that private investment is 
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of  separate  investment  regressions  for 39  developing  countries,  19 of 
them  Latin American.  Aggregate  demand  variables  are almost  always 
positively  associated  with investment,  as are measures  of the availability 
of credit; measures  of uncertainty  or instability are negatively  associated 
with investment.  Cost of capital variables usually enter investment  equa- 
tions  with  the  right  sign,  but  are typically  not  statistically  significant. 
Public investment  more often  appears as a substitute  for private invest- 
ment than a complement  in the studies  he reports, though  this result in 
not typical of the investment  literature. 
Cardoso (1990) presents  regressions  on panel data for six Latin Ameri- 
can countries.  Changes  in the  terms  of trade,  the growth  rate of GDP, 
and the share of public investment  in GDP are all significantly correlated 
with  investment.  Public  and  private  investment  are positively  associ- 
ated. Other variables that might be expected  to affect investment,  includ- 
ing a measure  of economic  instability, the stock of internal government 
debt, and exchange  rate depreciation,  do not enter investment  equations 
significantly;  only  the  debt to exports  ratio makes  a significant  entry in 
one equation. 
Solimano  (1989),  in  a careful  study  of  the  determinants  of  Chilean 
investment,  finds  strong  evidence  that  uncertainty  or  instability-of 
output,  the  real exchange  rate,  and  the  real interest  rate-reduce  in- 
vestment.  His evidence  also shows  a complex  relationship  between  the 
level  of the real exchange  rate and investment:  an overvalued  exchange 
rate  tends  to  encourage  investment,  but  the  higher  investment  is 
nonsustainable.40 
The time series studies  of investment  point to several macroeconomic- 
policy-related  variables  as  affecting  the  rate  of  investment:  increased 
stability  of  output,  the  exchange  rate,  and  the  cost  of capital increase 
investment;  so does  the availability of credit; and in several studies,  the 
external debt has a negative  impact on investment.41 The impact of pub- 
lic investment  on the overall rate of investment  has not been firmly tied 
down  in investment  studies.  The black market premium reduces  invest- 
ment,  as shown  in Equation (10); and a reduction  in the price of invest- 
ment  goods  increases  the quantity  of investment.  Thus the bulk of the 
evidence  suggests  an important  role for macroeconomic  policy in deter- 
mining the rate of investment-even  treating the role of income in invest- 
ment equations  with  due circumspection. 
The new  growth  theory  has focused  on the determinants  of physical 
40. The complexity  of this relationship  may account for the weak relationship  between  the 
exchange  rate and investment  found  in Cardoso's  study. 
41. Schmidt-Hebbel  and Mueller (1990) find the debt to GNP ratio has a significant impact on 
investment  in Morocco; they treat the debt as an indicator of macroeconomic uncertainty. Growth, Macroeconomics,  and Development  *  349 
investment,  even  though  the theory  frequently  relies on the accumula- 
tion of human  capital to generate  endogenous  long-run  growth.  Schultz 
(1988, p. 569) examines  the determinants  of schooling  for an 89 country 
sample.  The income  elasticity of primary school enrollment is 0.31, while 
that  for secondary  school  is  0.43.  The  relative  price  of  teachers  has  a 
strong negative  impact on enrollments.  Schultz's estimates  show  urban- 
ization increasing  primary school enrollment but reducing that for secon- 
dary school.  The teacher-student  ratio also increases with income,  more 
so  for primary  than  for secondary  school.  The positive  association  be- 
tween  income  and school  enrollment  suggests  a feedback effect between 
growth  and  its  determinants-including  macroeconomic  policy-and 
schooling.42 
It would  be interesting  as well  to examine  the policy-related  determi- 
nants of the efficiency  with which  human capital operates,  and therefore 
how  much  it contributes  to output  and  growth.  Schultz  (1988, p.  575) 
provides  estimates  of these  returns by continent  and level of schooling, 
which  generally  show  the  highest  returns  to  primary  education,  and 
higher returns in Latin America and Africa than elsewhere.  Taken at face 
value,  the latter findings  are hard to reconcile with the typically negative 
coefficients  on  dummy  variables for those  regions.  Part of the explana- 
tion  may  be  that  the  estimated  rates of return are based  on  data from 
before  the  1980s.  Both the  puzzle  of the rate of return results,  and  the 
relationship  between  the  return  to human  capital and  macroeconomic 
performance,  must be subjects of further study. 
4. Case  Studies 
While the cross-sectional  results on the determinants  of both growth and 
investment  rates  suggest  that  macroeconomic  factors  have  important 
effects,  they  do not  tie down  the channels  of influence,  nor the precise 
macroeconomic  factors that matter most.  Nor do they give any real sense 
of the macroeconomic  policy  decisions  that have to be faced in practice. 
An interesting  alternative  is presented  by Scholing  and Timmermann 
(1988), who  use  a path  model  in which  the  growth  rate is affected  by 
"inner" (latent) variables-physical  capital, human capital, the growth of 
labor, international  competitiveness,  and  political  instability-that  are 
estimated as linear combinations  of measurable "outer" variables.43  Essen- 
42. Although the regressions  in Section  2 show the level  of enrollment  as affecting  growth, 
as noted there, other regressions in the literature,  as well as the production  function 
(3), suggest that increases  in enrollment  should affect  growth. 
43. The analysis allows for degrees of latency,  with some latent  variables  being affected  by 
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tially, the approach allows for the creation of an index of, for example, 
macroeconomic  instability.  Both the robustness  of this approach,  which is 
closely related to the work by Morris  and Adelman (1988),  and the clarity 
of the interpretations  it provides remain to be seen.4 But by potentially 
putting structure  on the reasons variables  enter a model, it does present 
one possible way out of the difficulty  that a never-ending  array  of alterna- 
tive plausible variables  can be entered in cross-country  regressions. 
The case study approach presents another, less formal, method of 
drawing conclusions about the role of macroeconomic  factors. Corden 
(1991)  summarizes the results of a World  Bank study of macroeconomic 
policies, crisis, and growth in 17 developing countries, including  9 of the 
12 developing economies whose 1987  GNP exceeded $30 billion.45 
Fifteen of  the  countries studied  by  Corden experienced a  public 
spending boom between 1974 and 1981. Only India and Chile did not. 
While the timing and extent of the spending booms varied across coun- 
tries, the cause appears to have been either a rapid increase in export 
receipts, or the increased availability  of foreign financing. Many of the 
countries built up their foreign debt rapidly. Growth in the countries 
with public spending booms was high up to the end of the 1970s. For 
many  of  them,  the  investment  ratio  and  growth  fell  in  the  1980s.46 
Corden points  to  three lessons  from the  experiences of  the  boom 
period: smooth  spending  relative to  income,47  appraise investments 
carefully (this advice is offered to creditors as well),  and beware of 
euphoria-be  cautious.48 
Almost all the countries in the sample went into a recession or crisis  at 
the end of the 1970s or in the first years of the 1980s; Pakistan  is the 
exception. The macroeconomic story of the eighties is the story of the 
policy successes and failures  in dealing with the shocks that took place at 
44. For example,  Scholing  and  Timmermann  include  the  rate  of  inflation  as  an  outer 
variable determining  international  competitiveness;  in this paper it has been  taken as 
an indicator of macroeconomic  performance. 
45. Corden  discusses  Korea, which  was  not in the original study, and omits discussion  of 
Argentina,  which  was.  The larger developing  economies  included  in the World Bank 
study  are Argentina,  Brazil, Colombia,  India, Indonesia,  Mexico,  Pakistan, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand,  and Turkey. Egypt,  Korea, and Venezuela  are the remaining  three.  (China is 
excluded  because  the study  was confined  to nonsocialist  economies.) 
46. Corden  states  that  there  is  a negative  cross-country  correlation between  investment 
booms  in 1974-1980  and growth  from 1982 on. 
47. Corden expresses  this advice in different language.  It has to be recognized  though  that 
commodity  exporters  in the late 1970s, especially  oil exporters,  were in good company 
in believing  the good  times were  forever. 
48. Among  the  euphoric  cases  mentioned  by  Corden,  C6te  d'Ivoire,  which  is examined 
below,  raised public sector investment  from 11% of GNP to 21% in the 4 years following 
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the  turn  of the  decade.  There is no  uniform  pattern  of success:  Korea 
adjusted  immediately  and hard; Chile and Indonesia  adjusted  later and 
hard; Mexico adjusted  later yet.  Colombia and Thailand adjusted gradu- 
ally and successfully.  Turkey appeared  to have adjusted well in the mid- 
1980s,  but  has  still  not  dealt  with  its budget  deficit,  and  suffers  from 
rising  inflation.  Other  countries  in  the  group  are still  struggling.  The 
general  lesson  from these  episodes  is that growth  does  not return until 
the adjustments-especially  the fiscal adjustments-are  made.49 
A complex  relationship  between  inflation  and  growth  emerges  from 
the  cross-country  study.  The  simple  correlation between  inflation  and 
growth in the sample in the 1980s is weak, because the three low-growth 
African countries  have  low  inflation,  and because  high-growth  Turkey 
had high inflation.  Brazil during the period up to the 1980s (and Israel up 
to 1973) is the main exhibit for the case that high inflation is not inconsis- 
tent with  high  growth;  however  there is no case of high  growth  being 
consistent  for any length  of time with triple digit inflation.  Several of the 
high growth  countries  suffered  from inflation in excess  of 20% for a few 
years  during  the  early  1980s,  but  the  inflation  tended  to  come  down 
quickly-as  Corden argues,  it is important that inflationary expectations 
not become  entrenched,  and that the government's  commitment  to low 
inflation be established. 
Exchange  rate systems  among  the  17 countries  in the study  and over 
time within  the  countries  vary widely.  Periods  of overvaluation  associ- 
ated with  capital inflows  were  a common  feature of the macroeconomic 
instability at the turn of the decade.  Corden draws the lesson  that nomi- 
nal exchange  rates should  be adjusted  frequently, and that noninflation- 
ary monetary  policy should  generally be attained through a commitment 
to fiscal discipline  rather than  a nominal  exchange  rate. He  also  notes 
that there have been  many instances  of ineffective,  inflationary, nominal 
devaluations:  nominal  devaluations  should  generally be accompanied by 
a policy package  that includes  monetary  and fiscal adjustments. 
Most of the lessons  of the comparative  study  are completely  obvious, 
but were  nonetheless  violated  not only by government  officials but also 
by supposedly  hard-nosed  bankers in the late 1970s. Others, for instance 
the finding  that a commitment  to a nominal  exchange  rate target is not 
usually  effective,  are  less  obvious,  and  may  also  be  less  certain.50 To 
49. Corden does not specify the conclusions on the timing of adjustment  that should be 
drawn from the study; the conclusion in the text is consistent with the examples he 
presents. 
50. Reynolds (1986, p. 5) notes "there are hardly any general statements to which one 
cannot find exceptions in one country  or another"-a  conclusion  that becomes harder 
to dispute the more often one tries to draw general  lessons. 352 *  FISCHER 
Table 6  MACROECONOMIC  PERFORMANCE, COTE D'IVOIRE (1973-1989)a 
GDP  Bud.  Curr.  Terms  Real  Ext. 
growth  Inv  InvG  def.  a/c  def  of trade  ER  debt  Infl 
1973-76  5.9  22.7  13.8  2.9  4.0  100.9  125.9  16.5 
1977-80  5.2  28.3  18.1  6.5  11.5  141.9  156.5  55.2  14.5 
1981-83  0.9  23.2  10.7  12.7  13.5  81.3  110.1  124.8  3.5 
1984-87  1.4  11.6  6.3  4.5  1.8  106.5  103.0  130.7  3.0 
1988  -1.8  15.2  4.7  8.4  6.2  79.7  110.9  131.5  1.5 
1989  -1.3  10.3  3.1  11.3  9.7  68.6  104.3  139.0  -2.0 
aColumns  2, 3, 4, 5, and 8 are  variables  as ratio  to GDP;  InvG  is public  sector  investment,  including  public 
enterprises;  terms of trade  series (1984  = 100)  is from  BB,  spliced from  1986  to World  Bank  (1990b);  real 
exchange  rate series is from BB, spliced from 1987  to World  Bank  (1990b)-increase represents  apprecia- 
tion;  debt ratio  is for the last year in the period;  inflation  rate  is for the GDP  deflator. 
Sources:  World  Bank  (1990b,c);  Berthelemy  and Bourguignon  (1989)  (denoted  BB). 
provide  examples  illustrating  both  that the  lessons  are nonetheless  of 
value and the largely political economy  issues  they raise, I turn to two of 
the countries  examined  in the study.51 
4.1 COTE  D'IVOIRE 
For the first 15 years of its independence,  until 1975, C6te d'Ivoire was an 
outstanding  performer  among  developing  countries.52 Output  growth 
averaged 7.7% per annum,  with no major macroeconomic imbalances. As 
a member of the CFA zone,  with a fixed exchange rate against the French 
franc and its Francophone  neighbors,  it had low inflation throughout  the 
period.  Population  growth averaged over 4%, one quarter of that a result 
of immigration  from lower income  neighbors. 
Over the period  1980 to 1989, GDP rose by less than 1% per year, and 
per capita GNP fell more than 25%. Between  1975 and 1980 the economy 
was  derailed by a massive  public investment  program, whose  fiscal im- 
plications  were  for a time  covered  by a sharp but temporary  improve- 
ment in the terms of trade. It has not yet recovered from that and subse- 
quent shocks  and policy mistakes. 
Some  of  the  developments  seen  in  Table 6 and  in  Figures  1-3  are 
similar to  those  that  took  place  in  Latin America  at the  same  time.  A 
massive  improvement  in the terms of trade in 1977 combined  with  rap- 
idly increasing  government  spending  and borrowing  resulted  in a 14% 
increase  in  GNP  in  1978. The currency  appreciated  as domestic  prices 
rose  more  rapidly  than  abroad,  while  the  exchange  rate  remained 
51. Dervis  and  Petri (1987) examine  the  macroeconomics  of  two  of  the  more  successful 
developing countries,  Korea  and Turkey,  pointing  already  then to the dangers  raised  by 
Turkey's  inability  to deal with its fiscal  deficit. 
52. This account draws on World  Bank  (1990b)  and Berthelemy  and Bourgouignon  (1989). Growth,  Macroeconomics,  and  Development  353 
fixed-as  it has been  since  1946. Despite  the improvement  in the terms 
of  trade,  and  a more  than  doubling  of  the  dollar value  of exports  be- 
tween  1974 and  1980, the current account went  into large deficit. By the 
end of the decade,  the foreign debt to GDP ratio was above 50%, making 
the country  vulnerable  to the real interest  rate shock of the early 1980s. 
Cote  d'Ivoire  was  also  hit  very  hard  by  the  decline  in  commodity 
prices in the early 1980s, with  the terms of trade in 1982 being less than 
half the  1976 level.  Public  sector  investment  was  cut fast,  but govern- 
ment revenues  declined  pari passu,  leaving a double digit budget deficit. 
Although  the appreciation  of the dollar in the early 1980s produced a real 
depreciation  of  the  CFA franc,  the  current account  deficit remained  in 
double  digits in the early 1980s. 
Further  public  investment  cuts  and  revenue  measures  reduced  the 
budget  deficit after 1984; together  with  a temporary improvement  in the 
terms of trade, this led to a turnaround in the current account after 1984. 
Growth  however  remained  slow,  failing  to  keep  up  with  population 
growth  of 4.1%. In 1988 and 1989 the terms of trade worsened,  govern- 
ment spending  rose and revenues  fell, and the budget deficit returned to 
Figure  1 COTE  D'IVOIRE:  GDP GROWTH  AND INVESTMENT 
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double  digits.  The currency continued  to depreciate  slowly,  as tight do- 
mestic policy  and massive  unemployment  reduced  domestic  prices. But 
the  current account  deficit  worsened,  leading  to payments  arrears and 
the  suspension  of  debt  servicing.  Aggregate  growth  turned  negative, 
while  per  capita  income  declined  by  more  than  5% a year.  Declining 
incomes  and  rising  unemployment  led  to political  difficulties,  and  the 
appointment  of a new  government  in 1990. 
One  source  of  Cote  d'Ivoire's  budget  difficulties  was  a government 
commitment  to fixed CFA franc prices for the main export crops,  coffee 
and cocoa,  that by 1989 were nearly double the world level.  These prices 
were  cut  in  the  second  half  of  1989.  Civil  service  salaries  are a major 
budgetary  expenditure,  amounting  to 12% of GDP, which has been diffi- 
cult to cut despite  the need  to adjust internal prices to the fixed exchange 
rate. 
The  exchange  rate system  is a key  issue  for Cote  d'Ivoire and  other 
countries  in the franc zone.  The 14 countries  of the zone  have had free 
capital movements  within  the zone  and with  France for over 40 years, 
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have  had relatively  low  inflation,  and until the late 1970s, grew rapidly. 
For most of its existence,  the franc zone  has benefitted  its members,  who 
are reluctant  to  give  it  up.  Devaluation  of  the  CFA franc against  the 
French franc would  be difficult, not only because  of the inevitable loss of 
credibility of the exchange  rate commitment,  but also because  the coun- 
tries of the zone  are overvalued  to differing extents. 
The  new  Ivoirian  government  is  committed  to  pursuing  a rigorous 
adjustment  program.  It will  attempt  to restore macroeconomic  balance 
by cutting  current government  expenditures,  including  wages,  and by 
reforming  the  tax system.  Cutting  current government  expenditures  is 
urgent,  since  the  rate  of  public  investment  is  incompatible  with  sus- 
tained growth.  The government  also intends  to increase the efficiency of 
public  enterprises,  in  part  through  privatization.  It will  also  have  to 
make a variety of regulatory  and incentive  reforms,  using  nonexchange 
rate measures  to provide  incentives  to export. 
Cote d'Ivoire provides  an example  of a country where macroeconomic 
policies  and  mistakes,  especially  the  euphoria  during  1976-1980,  have 
had a major impact on growth  over a sustained  period.  The decision  to 
Figure 3 COTE  D'IVOIRE:  REAL  EXCHANGE  RATE  AND TERMS  OF TRADE 
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stay  with  the  fixed  exchange  rate has  been  extremely  important,  and 
may not be sustainable.  The inability  of the government  to cut current 
government  spending,  especially  civil service  salaries,  has been  an im- 
portant  macroeconomic  factor, with  roots  that lie in the  political econ- 
omy of the country. Of course,  macroeconomics  is far from being all that 
matters: the country's  growth  suffered in the first instance from terms of 
trade shocks,  and  suffers  also from most  of the familiar microeconomic 
distortions  and inefficiencies,  including  inefficient  public enterprises. 
4.2 CHILE 
The  story  of  Chile's  economic  recovery  is  worth  retelling,  for both  its 
negative  and  positive  lessons.53 Chile  has  been  through  two  extremely 
tough  adjustment  periods.  The first came after the military government 
took power  in 1973, confronting  an economy  in near-total disarray. The 
government  removed  price controls,  devalued,  and  moved  the  budget 
from a deficit of 30% in 1973 to a surplus by 1976. An important liberaliza- 
tion program reduced  tariffs to a uniform  10% by 1979. Companies  and 
banks  that had  been  nationalized  under  the  Allende  government  were 
privatized. The fiscal squeeze,  accompanied by a nearly 40% decline in the 
terms of trade between  1974 and  1975, created a massive  recession.  Due 
partly to monetary tightening,  the real interest rate exceeded 60%  in 1976.54 
Table  7  MACROECONOMIC  PERFORMANCE,  CHILE  (1973-1989)a 
GDP  Bud.  Curr.  Terms  Real  Ext. 
growth  Inv  InvG  def.  alc  def  of trade  ER  debt  Infl 
1973  -5.6  7.9  8.4  30.5  2.8  187.2  70.9  418.1 
1974  1.0  21.2  12.5  5.4  1.9  197.8  74.7  694.2 
1975  -12.9  13.1  9.2  2.0  6.8  118.5  63.3  342.4 
1976-80  7.5  16.8  6.0  -3.1  4.5  114.3  77.4  45.2  97.3 
1981  5.5  22.7  5.1  -0.3  14.5  84.3  108.1  50.1  12.2 
1982  -14.1  11.3  4.7  3.4  9.5  80.4  99.0  76.7  13.3 
1983  -0.7  9.8  4.8  3.3  5.6  87.5  89.1  98.8  26.6 
1984-86  4.8  14.3  6.9  3.0  8.6  79.8  86.6  141.6  22.1 
1987-88  5.6  17.0  6.8  2.0  2.8  86.5  63.3  96.3  21.2 
1989  10.0  20.4  3.6  97.3  62.5  78.3  13.2 
aColumns  2, 3, 4, 5, and 8 are variables  as ratio to GDP;  InvG is public sector investment, including 
public  enterprises;  increase  in real exchange  rate index represents  appreciation;  debt ratio  is for the last 
year  in the period;  inflation  rate  is for the GDP  deflator. 
Sources:  World Bank (1990b,c),  Corbo and Solimano  (1991)  and, Morgan  Guaranty  Trust  (for real ex- 
change  rate) 
53. In this section  I draw on Douglas  (1989), Corbo and Solimano  (1991), and World Bank 
(1990b). 
54. Corbo and Solimano  (1991) examine  the controversy  over the stance of monetary policy 
in 1975, concluding  that monetary  policy was restrictive. Growth,  Macroeconomics,  and  Development  *  357 
Figure  4 CHILE:  GDP GROWTH  AND INVESTMENT 
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The  inflation  rate  was  however  slow  to  come  down,  remaining  in 
triple  digits  through  1977.  Regarding  the  inflation  as  largely  inertial, 
particularly because  of the budget  surplus,  the government  instituted  a 
preannounced  schedule  of devaluations  at less than the current inflation 
rate, in the hope  of causing  expectations  to stabilize around the nominal 
exchange  rate anchor. With imports liberalized, foreign competition  was 
expected  to assert a disinflationary  impact,  reinforcing the expectations 
effect  of the  nominal  exchange  rate anchor.  In June 1979 the exchange 
rate was  fixed to the dollar. While inflation came down,  it did not come 
down  fast enough;  as can be seen  in Figures 4-6,  the real exchange  rate 
appreciated  rapidly from 1978. The terms of trade began  declining  after 
1979. The current account  worsened  rapidly, reaching  14.5% of GDP in 
1981; the  external  debt  increased;  and  Chile  had  once  again  to adjust, 
even  before the debt crisis struck at the end of 1982. 
Chile devalued  in 1982, helping  precipitate a financial crisis for banks 
and firms that had borrowed  abroad. In 1981 and 1982 the domestic  real 
interest  rate exceeded  30%. The fiscal deficit  (including  the quasi-fiscal 
_ 
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deficit of the central bank) rose to near 9% of GDP in 1982.55  The cutting 
off of external  lending,  the  adverse  changes  in the terms of trade,  and 
the  domestic  financial  crisis resulted  in a 14% decline  in  GDP and  an 
increase  in the  unemployment  rate to 33%. For a time the government 
raised tariffs to 35%, for revenue  reasons.  A generally  tight fiscal policy 
was accompanied  by targeted employment  programs. 
It took 2 years  for the recovery  to begin.  Between  1981 and  1986 the 
government  succeeded  in producing  a real devaluation  of nearly 40%. 
Inflation  rose  temporarily  to  more  than  30% in  1985,  but  then  came 
down  to the low  20% range,  where  it has stayed  since; the real interest 
rate has also declined  to near 10%. In 1985 the government  adopted  an 
adjustment  program,  which  not only  privatized,  liberalized,  and began 
to  cut  tariffs  again,  but  also  provided  targeted  assistance  to  alleviate 
poverty.  The program  was  designed  to diversify  exports  and  make the 
Figure  5 CHILE:  GROWTH,  BUDGET,  AND CURRENT  A/C DEFICIT 
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55. See  Corbo  and  Solimano  (1991) for an  estimate  of  the  total deficit.  The  total deficit 
peaked  at 9.8% of GDP in 1985; there was a surplus by 1987. The data shown  in Table 7 
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economy  less  vulnerable  to external shocks,  in part by instituting  a cop- 
per stabilization  fund  that smooths  government  use  of funds  from cop- 
per export revenues.  The current account improved  as exports boomed, 
helped  in  1988  and  1989 by  improving  terms  of  trade.  GDP  growth 
increased  from 1985 to 1989, reaching  a probably unsustainable  10% in 
1989; by 1987 GDP had returned to its 1981 level and by 1988 unemploy- 
ment was below  7%. 
The  Chilean  experience  has  been  mined  for  more  than  its  macro- 
economic  policy  lessons.  But there  is  little  doubt  that macroeconomic 
policy mistakes,  especially  in the late 1970s and early 1980s, had a major 
impact on Chilean  growth  during  the last two  decades.  The attempt to 
deal with inflation through the exchange rate turned into a disaster, which 
was  amplified  by  the  international  debt  crisis.  The  rigorous  macro- 
economic  policies  pursued  since  provide  a stable  background  against 
which  microeconomic  distortions  have  been  effectively  removed.  The 
empirical  work  by  Solimano  (1989) suggests  also  that macroeconomic 
stability has been  an essential  ingredient  in the recovery of investment. 
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The continuing  double  digit  inflation  remains  a problem,  one  which  is 
common  to  many  other  countries  that have  stabilized  from very  high 
inflation. 
Lessons  can be  learned  also  by  contrasting  Chilean  experience  with 
that of Argentina  and  Brazil. Those  countries  failed  to deal  with  their 
macroeconomic  imbalances  during  the  1980s, growth  has not resumed, 
and attempts  at efficiency-enhancing  adjustment  programs have for the 
most  part failed  as  macroeconomic  instability  leads  to frequent  policy 
reversals. 
It remains  in  this  section  to  comment  on  Figures  1 and  4,  for C6te 
d'Ivoire and  Chile,  respectively.  These  confirm in a time series  context 
the  very  strong  relationship  between  growth  and  the  share  of invest- 
ment  seen  in  Sections  1  and  2.  However,  it  is  difficult  to  see  these 
relationships  as  reflecting  purely  the  supply  side  impact  of  increased 
capital on  output,  rather than-as  in Equation (7)-both  a supply  side 
effect  and  an  accelerator  effect  in  which  increased  demand  leads  to 
higher investment. 
The restoration  of growth  in many  countries  requires an increase  in 
investment.  Chile is one of the few non-Asian  countries badly hit by the 
crisis of the early 1980s in which  investment  has increased  significantly 
and  growth  has  returned.  But the  recovery  of investment  takes  time, 
evidence  of increased  returns to capital, and a period of economic  stabil- 
ity. Here too macroeconomic  policy matters. 
5. Concluding  Comments 
The  primary  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  establish  that a country's  macro- 
economic  policies  matter  for  long-run  growth.  Provided  the  inflation 
rate, external  debt,  and  the  government  deficit are accepted  as macro- 
economic  policy  indicators,  both the cross-sectional  regressions  and the 
case  studies  support  that  contention.  The results  are less  clear on  the 
mechanisms  through  which  macroeconomic  policy  affects growth,  but 
the case studies  and much other evidence  suggests  they have a powerful 
impact on investment.  The separate role of macroeconomic  policy  vari- 
ables in the growth  regressions  implies  the existence  of other channels, 
which  need  further investigation. 
It could be argued that the case studies  show  only that macroeconomic 
policy  affects growth  in the short run,  and that the effects of such poli- 
cies  are transitory.  It is  difficult  to deal  with  this  contention  over  very 
long  periods-for  instance,  the  rapid growth  of the post-World  War II 
period can be seen as a catch-up from the absence of growth in the Great 
Depression,  so  that by  1973 the  world  was  back where  it would  have Growth,  Macroeconomics,  and  Development  361 
been  had  growth  proceeded  smoothly  since  1929.  This  is  a unit  root 
issue.  But it would  be  a mistake  to focus  exclusively  on  the  very  long 
run: it was only in 1989 that Chilean per capita income recovered its 1970 
level.  That long  period  of unnecessarily  low  income  certainly had wel- 
fare consequences  for many, even  if by 2010 Chile is back where it would 
have been. 
The simplicity  of the macroeconomic  policy lessons  that can be drawn 
from  country  studies  raises  the  question  of  why  those  lessons  are so 
frequently  not implemented.  Here is the role for political economy,  both 
in recognizing  the particular circumstances  of individual  countries,  and 
in seeking  to develop  more general theories.5  The theories may contrib- 
ute understanding,  even  if they  do not suggest  how  to change  the poli- 
cies. 
This paper  contends  that macroeconomic  policy  matters for growth, 
but  not  that  only  macroeconomic  policy  matters.  Reasonable  macro- 
economic  stability  is  probably  necessary  for sustained  growth,  but be- 
yond  that  the  overall  economic  strategy  pursued  by  the  country- 
market and outward  orientation,  the size and role of government  both in 
providing  physical  and  social infrastructure,  especially  for human  capi- 
tal, and in limiting  its role in other areas-is  crucial. 
The  new  growth  theory  and  the  associated  empirical work  have  fo- 
cused  on these  more structural factors. The empirical work characterizes 
high-growth  countries:  for instance,  they invest  a lot,  they have  higher 
school enrollment,  they are more open.  But it has not explored with any 
care the mechanisms  that are central to endogenous  growth theory-for 
instance,  whether  the process  of human  capital accumulation  bears any 
similarity to the  production  functions  for human  capital typical in that 
literature. Nor has it yet  succeeded  in identifying  the underlying  deter- 
minants  of investment,  though  the  relative  price effect emphasized  by 
de  Long  and  Summers  (1990) must  be  an important  part of the  story. 
Identifying  the determinants  of investment,  and the other factors con- 
tributing  to  growth,  will  probably  require a switch  away  from  simple 
cross-sectional  regressions  to time series studies  of individual  countries, 
of the type discussed  in Section  3. 
Solow  (1989) discusses  the difficulties  of integrating  short-run macro- 
economics  with  growth  theory.57  There are indeed  formidable problems 
in constructing  a tractable theoretical model  of this type.  But any model 
that includes  a production  function  and that accounts  for the accumula- 
tion of factors of production  and the efficiency of their use can be used to 
56. See for example  Alesina  and Drazen  (1989). 
57. See  also  Orphanides  and  Solow  (1990). The same  point  is made  in the development 
context by Arida and Taylor (1989). 362  FISCHER 
analyze  long-run  growth.  Each of these  elements  has been modeled  and 
estimated;  they  can be brought  together  to provide  a coherent empirical 
account of growth. 
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Any  economist  visiting  Ghana  in  the  early  1980s would  immediately 
have  concluded  that economic  policies  were  a major factor in the coun- 
try's  declining  level  of  per  capita  income.  The  exchange  rate was  so 
overvalued  that the  black market premium  was  about 900%, and most 
exportable  commodities  were  smuggled  out of the country. The rate of 
inflation  was  reaching  the  triple  digit  mark.  The communications  and 
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falling  as  the  government  discriminated  so  heavily  against  agriculture 
that farmers did not even  bother to pick the cocoa. 
But,  having  reached  that conclusion,  our itinerant  economist  would 
have been  unable  to provide  a simple  theoretical explanation  as to why 
the growth  rate was affected by these policies.  Development  economists 
have long been frustrated with the tension between  the obvious  negative 
contribution  of poor economic  policies  to growth rates and the failure of 
economic  theory  to provide  a framework  for analysis.  It has only  been 
with  the  emergence  of  the  new  growth  theory,  focusing  as it does  on 
factors permitting  persistent  growth,  that there was any analytical basis 
for discussing  the  contribution  of policy  to  anything  other  than  once- 
and-for all shifts in the level of output. 
There is still a long  way  to go in reaching a satisfactory framework or 
understanding  of determinants  of growth rates. We recognize  the role of 
factor accumulation,  and indeed  focus analysis  of growth around a pro- 
duction  function  so that factor accumulation  and increases  in efficiency 
are, by definition,  the sources  of growth.  But as soon  as it is recognized 
that  factor  accumulation  itself  may  be  a  function  of  economic  policy 
(through,  for example,  the incentives  to invest  provided  by a higher or 
lower real rate of return as influenced  by policy-induced  distortions) and 
that the  rate of  growth  of  efficiency  (total factor productivity)  may  be 
affected by policies,  difficulties  arise. 
Stanley Fischer's paper is a valuable contribution to the literature seek- 
ing to understand  the interactions  of policies,  efficiency, and factor accu- 
mulation  in affecting  growth  rates. First, he demonstrates  convincingly 
the  importance  of  macroeconomic  policies  as an influence  on  growth. 
Second,  he provides  a valuable discussion  of some of the other pertinent 
literature. Third, his analysis of his results, and of the difficulties confront- 
ing  those  attempting  to link policy  and  performance,  is itself valuable. 
In these  comments,  I want to focus on two additional issues  that arise 
in attempting  to understand  the interactions  of policies  and other vari- 
ables on growth  rates, and then to point to a few minor questions  where 
alternative interpretations  of his regression  results are possible. 
The first issue  is conceptual,  and has to do with the base from which  a 
"growth  rate effect"  should  be  measured.  One  of  the  many  problems 
that are confronted  when  attempting  to explain growth rates is that they 
are a function  of  several  variables.  For example,  countries  that experi- 
ence improving  terms of trade should,  on economic  grounds,  be able to 
realize  more  rapid  observed  growth  than  countries  with  deteriorating 
terms of trade. Thus,  over Fischer's period of observation  (which ends in 
1985),  oil  exporters  should  have  been  able  to  experience  more  rapid 366  KRUEGER 
recorded growth  than oil importers.  Likewise,  if there are internal differ- 
ences  among  countries  (for example,  in  the  existing  stock  of  human 
capital, or in the nature of the terrain affecting the productivity of invest- 
ment),  these  might affect the  rate of growth.  The debate  about conver- 
gence  points  to another  such  issue:  perhaps  the growth  rate is affected 
by the level  of per capita income. 
A second  set of variables pertains to determinants  of the rate of factor 
accumulation:  it  may  be  partly  a function  of  policy,  but  partly  also  a 
function of, for example,  the level of per capita income,  or even "cultural 
differences"  that affect savings  behavior.  In addition,  some countries are 
recipients  of  large  inflows  of  foreign  aid  for  political  reasons,  which 
should  also permit more rapid growth than would  otherwise  be feasible. 
The third set  is policies.  In a sense,  what  one  would  like to know  is 
how  rapid growth  might be in the presence  of "best policies,"  whatever 
they  are,  and  how  slow  (i.e.,  negative)  it might  be in the  presence  of 
"worst policies."  Such a range might differ between  countries because of 
the  first two  factors  mentioned.  The  real question  for analysis  of  the 
impact of policies  is how  much the policy  stance contributed to a reduc- 
tion  in  the  growth  rate contrasted  with  what  it might  otherwise  have 
been.  Yet, we  are far from being  able to answer  that question. 
Moreover,  there  are  a number  of  policies  that  probably  impact  ad- 
versely on growth  (or that favor more rapid growth) in addition to macro 
policies.  These  include  the trade and payments  regime,  credit rationing 
and its impact  on resource  allocation,  intervention  in the labor market, 
policies  toward  agriculture,  and  the  efficiency  of  the  public  sector  in 
providing  infrastructure.  Ideally, what is needed  is an understanding  of 
the interaction of policies,  and a means for estimating  the contribution of 
each to accelerating or reducing  the rate of economic  growth.  A question 
that arises is that "goodness"  of macroeconomic  policies is clearly corre- 
lated  with  "goodness"  of these  other  policies.  For this reason,  what  is 
really needed  is a full specification  of the set of policies  that impacts on 
growth,  and a model  that permits  the simultaneous  estimation  of these 
effects  related  to  the  gap  between  the  observed  growth  rate and  the 
"potential" growth  rate, the  "worst possible"  growth  rate, or the  "best 
possible"  growth  rate. 
The  second  issue  has  to do  with  the  relationship  between  observed 
growth  rates and the underlying  phenomenon  we  seek to observe.  It is 
inevitably  confronted  by those  attempting  to do any empirical work on 
determinants  of growth.  We all know  that fluctuations  in weather,  posi- 
tive and negative  transitory shifts in the terms of trade, and other factors 
affect observed  year-to-year growth  rates, and, thus,  we use longer time 
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there  is an additional  problem:  over  periods  much  longer  than a year, 
growth  rates can be observed  that are not in the longer run sustainable. 
Countries  can  (as  Fischer  notes  Latin  America  did)  maintain  growth 
rates over  considerable  periods  of  time  by borrowing  from abroad,  or 
otherwise  offsetting  low real rates of return to domestic factors of produc- 
tion. But, barring exceptional  good  fortune,  growth rates based on exter- 
nal  borrowing  at  real  interest  rates  above  the  real  rate  of  return  on 
investment,  are not  sustainable,  and  there  is an important  issue  as to 
how  to treat, e.g.,  the Brazilian growth  rate over the 1970-1985  period. 
In 1985 Brazil had  a large  stock  of  foreign  debt  that would  inevitably 
result  in  smaller  increases  in  real  income  in  some  future  years  than 
would  have  happened  without  that borrowing.  For this reason,  Brazil's 
observed  growth  rate-and  that of other  heavily  indebted  countries- 
over  the  1960-1989  period  covered  by Fischer's regressions  was  above 
the sustainable  rate. 
Let me now  turn to some  minor issues  that arise when  estimating  the 
impact of policy  on growth  rates, and interpreting  the results.  First, use 
of standard time period,  such as 1960-1989  for all countries,  requires the 
use of average values  for indicators of policies  and other variables. Even 
among  the  countries  included  by Fischer, there have  been  large differ- 
ences  in  policies.  For example,  Brazil between  1968 and  1974 was  a 
reasonably low-inflation,  outer-oriented  economy  and experienced  rapid 
growth,  and Turkey changed  policies  markedly in 1980 as Fischer notes. 
Ideally, one  would  like to single  out periods  during which  policies  were 
of a particular kind,  using  the period  when  the policy  stance was  fairly 
stable as the unit of observation. 
Second,  as I already noted,  policy  stances are highly  correlated across 
countries: countries  with large fiscal deficits are likely to have large black 
market  premia,  discrimination  against  agriculture,  and  highly  restric- 
tionist trade regimes.  This makes interpretation of the regression  results 
for any single  policy  somewhat  less  robust than might otherwise  be the 
case.  Fischer's  black market results  are an example  of this.  I share his 
puzzlement  at the  results,  noting  only  that  a large black market  pre- 
mium may reflect a highly  distorted  trade regime,  and while investment 
goods  may in those  circumstances  be cheap for those obtaining licenses, 
such  regimes  typically  result  in  smaller  export  earnings  and  thus  a 
smaller overall  level  of imports  of capital goods  than would  be feasible 
with a lower black market premium. 
Third,  there is reason  to question  the  "continent" dummy  variables. 
While  Korea's growth  rate is more  like Taiwan's growth  rate than like 
Sudan's,  it is also true that Korea's policies  are more like Taiwan's than 
Sudan's.  Since  policies  among  the rapidly growing  Asian  countries  are 368 *  SALA-I-MARTIN 
similar,  as  were  those  for  the  period  covered  by  Fischer  among  the 
African and Latin American  countries,  it is not clear what the continent 
dummy  variable  is  in  fact  representing,  if  not  average  differences  in 
policies. 
Finally, there are interesting  questions  about the relationships  between 
macroeconomic  policies  and microeconomic  policies.  Fischer notes  that 
inflation  and  large fiscal deficits  are indications  of governments  out  of 
control. There are important questions  as to why, however,  which center 
on political economy  issues.  One naive model might be as follows: govern- 
ments  pursue  inappropriate  microeconomic  policies  that,  for given  re- 
sources,  incipiently  reduce the growth  rate. If, however,  the growth rate 
falls below  some  acceptable  level,  there are likely  to be political reper- 
cussions.  To offset  that,  governments  embark on  unsustainable  deficit 
financing to offset the incipient decline in the growth rate. When inflation 
accelerates to the point where  it, too, is politically costly, foreign borrow- 
ing is used as a means to sustain growth.  Only when foreign creditors will 
no longer  extend  credit is action undertaken  to alter micro- and macro- 
economic  policies.  In this model,  it is microeconomic  policies  that are a 
drag on the growth rate, and expansive  macroeconomic  policies are used 
in the shorter term to offset their negative  effect. 
If that is the case,  some  minimally  rational microeconomic  policies  are 
a necessary  condition  for stable macroeconomic  policy. However,  other 
interpretations  are equally possible.  All that seems  certain at this stage is 
that policies  do matter, and that any theory of growth that ignores  them 
will  miss  an essential  part of the  explanation  for differences  in perfor- 
mance among  developing  countries  in the years since the Second World 
War. 
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geneity  of other factors that are shown  to have long-run  growth  effects. 
Most of these  things  are not  obviously  macroeconomic  even  though  in 
most of these stories,  governments  can affect the steady-state  growth rate 
of  the  economy  through  policy  interventions.  There  are also  models 
where  the growth  rate of the economy  is affected by investment  distor- 
tions,  government  spending  and  public  investment,  or  distortionary 
taxes and subsidies.1  Even though  these  variables are macroeconomic  in 
nature,  they  do not seem  to be what Fischer has in mind.  The question 
asked  in this  paper  is whether  short-run macro  management,  "defined  as 
monetary,  fiscal and exchange  rate policies  and reflected in the inflation 
rate, the  budget  deficit,  and  the balance  of payments,  [also] affect the 
long-run  growth  rate of the economy".2 
To answer  this question  Fischer first presents  a few plausible stories of 
why  and how  that may be the case.  He then provides  some evidence  on 
the cross section  partial correlation between  the rates of growth rate and 
investment  and the inflation  rate, the budget  deficit, the ratio of foreign 
debt to GDP debt,  and  the black market premium.  Finally, he provides 
two case studies  for C6te d'Ivoire and Chile to further support his case. I 
will  discuss  the  theoretical  and empirical parts of the paper separately. 
When discussing  the theoretical part I will assume  that the data say that 
short-run macro policy  affects growth,  and when  discussing  the empiri- 
cal part  I will  assume  that  there  is  a  theory  behind  it.  As  it  will  be 
apparent from my latter discussion,  I think that the plausibility  of these 
two assumptions  can be defended  with a limited degree  of success. 
2. The Theory 
When  one  asks  the  question  of  whether  macro  policies  matter  for 
growth,  the  first  thing  that  comes  to  mind  is:  how  would  they?  As 
Fischer  suggests  in  the  paper,  most  of  the  elaborated  theories  on  the 
relation between  growth  rates or steady-state  GDP levels  and inflation 
(all of which  can be found  in Blanchard and Fischer, 1989) predict either 
no  relation-superneutrality  of money  (Sidrauski,  1967)-or  a positive 
relation3 (Tobin, 1965; Romer, 1987; Weil, 1987). 
1. See Barro  and Sala-i-Martin  (1990)  for a survey on the role of public  finance  in models of 
endogenous growth. 
2. It is hard  to see how the real  exchange  rate  can be misaligned  in the long run without the 
introduction  of tariffs  or other microeconomic  distortions.  The existing  theories  of nomi- 
nal rigidities  suggest that the effects of monetary  policy on the real exchange rate will 
last, if at all, only a few years and, therefore,  will not affect  the long-run  growth rate  of 
the economy. 
3. These models predict a positive relation between inflation and growth  rates  along the 
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Hence,  in order to argue  that inflation  is bad for growth,  he calls on 
some  unelaborated  yet  plausible  old  mechanisms  through  which  the 
inflation rate reduces  the long run level of income.  He suggests  that chang- 
ing  the  production  function  along  the  lines  suggested  by  endogenous 
growth  theory  will  transform  these  stories  that in normal  neoclassical 
models  have  level effects, into steady-state  growth theories  of the negative 
consequences  of inflation.  As a result,  and I suppose  that by the laws of 
continuous  compounding,  inflation  will become  a large and very costly 
problem  worth  worrying  about.  The  proposed  mechanisms  are  "the 
negative  effect  of  inflation  on  the  efficiency  of  the  exchange  mecha- 
nism,"  and  "all the costs  of inflation  detailed  in Fischer and Modigliani 
(1978). "4 
My reaction to this is twofold:  first, if what we  want is to explain  the 
correlation between  the growth  rate over a period  of 15 to 25 years and 
inflation or any other variable, we  do not need  this variable to affect the 
steady-state  growth rate. If the  economy  finds  itself  in the  transition  to- 
wards a higher steady-state  level of income  in a neoclassical  type of model, 
the  growth  rate along  such  transition  will  also  be  correlated with  the 
relevant variable. In other words,  cross country regressions  involving  15 
or 25 years  worth  of  growth  have  little  to  say  about  the  steady-state 
growth  rate.5 
And  second,  things  that have  small or negligible  effects on the levels 
of income  and welfare  in neoclassical  models  will have small or negligi- 
ble effects in the growth rate and welfare in endogenous  growth models. 
It is true that if the growth  rate is 0.000001 percentage  points larger from 
now  to infinity,  the  level  of income  in a few  hundreds  of years will be 
very far away  from the level  that would  otherwise  have been.  Yet once 
we  properly  discount  the  difference,  the  effect  on  welfare  will  still be 
negligible.  Thus,  if these  effects  were  not worth  worrying  about before 
endogenous  growth  theory, they are still not worth worrying about now. 
The relation between  budget  deficits and growth also lacks solid foun- 
dation.  Theories  of infinitely  lived  households  suggest  that budget  defi- 
4. Some  of  the  costs  of  larger expected  inflation  highlighted  in  Fischer and  Modigliani 
(1978) are (1) the losses  due  to changing  price more often,  "menu costs,"  (2) the  shoe 
leather costs  of going  to the bank more often,  and (3) an increase in the cost of capital 
due to a nominal  tax system.  As pointed  out by the authors,  the first two are very small 
and the third is ambiguous.  They also highlight  (4) the offsetting  "Tobin effect" and the 
redistributional  effects  due to the asymmetric  holding  of nominal assets. 
5. This of course does  not mean that we should  not be interested  in the determinants  of the 
long-run  growth  rate.  I think  that the  interesting  endogenous  growth  models  are the 
ones  that explore these  determinants.  On the other hand,  I do not think that old fashion 
models  that emphasize  distortions  that have level effects in neoclassical  models  and that 
are amended  with  Ak technologies  are interesting  growth  theories  (or at least they are 
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cits have no effects on the level of income  (Barro, 1974) while  theories of 
stochastically  extinguishable  individuals  suggest  that they have  a nega- 
tive effect on income  through  higher real interest rates and the crowding 
out of investment  (Blanchard, 1985). Both the transitional dynamics  and 
the endogenous  growth  extension  of this latter model  would  predict a 
negative  relation  between  growth  and  budget  deficits.  The problem  is 
that they  would  also  predict  that the  effect  would  disappear  once  we 
hold constant  investment  (as Fischer does  in all his growth  regressions) 
and  that  the  relation  between  government  surplus  and  investment 
would  be  positive,  while  Fischer  finds  it to be  negative  (see  Fischer's 
Table 4, any column).  Again,  we do not have a good theory that explains 
this relation directly. 
In the absence  of theories  that explain how  inflation and deficits affect 
economic  growth  directly, we  could think that the existing  correlation is 
either spurious  or the direction of causation is reversed: reverse causation 
is especially  plausible for the budget  deficit since low growth periods will 
be associated  with low tax revenues  and high deficits. If governments  find 
it hard to  change  tax rates  and  spending,  they  may  also  resort to sei- 
gniorage  to  finance  the  larger  gap  between  revenue  and  spending, 
thereby  drawing  a negative  association  between  inflation  and  growth. 
As far as the spurious  correlation is concerned,  there are several possi- 
bilities.  First,  inflation  could  be  symptomatic  of  financial  repression. 
Some  governments  may  not  want  to allow  the  financial  system  to de- 
velop  for seigniorage  reasons:  when  the level  of financial sophistication 
is  low,  the  money  demand  elasticity  will  be  small  (as  people  cannot 
substitute  away  from  currency)  thereby  increasing  the  possibility  of 
large  inflation  tax  collection.  To the  extent  that  the  level  of  financial 
development  matters  for  growth,  the  growth  rate  will  be  negatively 
associated  with  the  inflation  rate, even  though  inflation  does  not have 
any direct real effect on growth  (Roubini and Sala-i-Martin, 1991). 
Second,  the  level  of  inflation  may  be  proxying  for the  volatility  of 
inflation.  Inflation  would  then  be  symptomatic  of  uncertainty  and  it 
would  be correlated with growth even  though  it does not matter directly. 
This argument  runs  into  trouble  since,  as Fischer notes  in footnote  25, 
when  one  holds  constant  the  level  of inflation  in a growth  regression, 
the  coefficient  of variation  does  not  matter. Barro (1990) finds  that the 
change  in the inflation  rate is actually more relevant. 
Third,  large  inflation  rates  (and/or  budget  deficits)  are proxying  for 
general trouble: governments,  like alcoholics,  do not know when  to stop 
and when  they screw up, they screw up big time! Thus, even though only 
"micro" distortions  and  policies  have  long-run  real effects,  macro vari- 
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the former. In Fischer's own words  "a government  that is producing high 
inflation  . . . [or] runs large budget  deficits is a government  that has lost 
control." 
3. The  Empirical  Evidence 
In Fischer's Table 1, the  economic  performance  of three sets  of areas- 
Africa, Latin America,  and Asia-is  analyzed  through the averages over 
three periods of 13, 7, and 8 years, respectively.  It is observed that, across 
the nine data  points originating from this experiment,  the relation between 
inflation  and  growth  is "predominantly  negative,"  between  the budget 
deficit and growth is "apparently negative," and between  investment  and 
growth  "broadly positive."  This is presented  as "prima facie evidence" 
that the quality of macroeconomic  management  affects growth. 
First, I already mentioned  my worries about the endogeneity  of all of 
these  macroeconomic  variables.  I agree  with  Fischer  that  most  of  the 
variables  used  by  him  and  by  other  empirical  growth  researchers  are 
largely endogenous.  But if the concept of "different degrees of endogene- 
ity" exists,  the budget  deficit should  get a high mark on it; using  it as a 
right-hand  side variable is, therefore,  especially  dangerous.  Second,  and 
more  importantly,  we  should  remember  that  the  assertions  made  are 
based  on  nine  data  points  (six  in  the  case  of  budget  deficits!).  They 
should  therefore  be taken as indications, not as prima facie evidence,  of 
the importance  of macro policy. Third, I am not sure what  is it that we 
learn from the average growth  performance over a period of 8 or 9 years: 
is it something  about long-run  growth  and development  or about reces- 
sions,  booms,  and  stabilization  programs?  We  should  think  that  the 
negative  relation between  inflation and growth  at these  rather high fre- 
quencies  sheds  more  light  on  the  right  way  to  think  about  business 
cycles.6 
The next  pieces  of evidence  presented  are some  "long"-term growth 
regressions  similar to those  found  in Barro (1991). It is interesting  to see 
that, despite  the criticisms on the robustness  of these  regressions  raised 
by  Levine  and  Renelt  (1990) and  subscribed  by  Fischer in  this  paper, 
most  of  the  evidence  presented  comes  from  the  same  type  of regres- 
sions.  I should  say that I think that the Levine and Renelt (1990) test of 
robustness  is too strong.  They classify  a variable as "nonrobust" if they 
find one combination  of right-hand  side  variables that turns the sign  of 
the relevant variable around.  I would  say that the estimated  coefficients 
must follow  some  distribution  as we  use different combinations  of inde- 
6. Believers  in Phillips  curves may find this inverse relation  puzzling. Comment 373 
pendent  variables.  It would  be surprising  to find that all of this distribu- 
tion has an either positive  or negative  domain,  but it never includes  a bit 
of both.  Hence,  it would  be  surprising  if they  did  not  find  that most 
variables are not robust. 
Leaving  the  problem  of robustness  (from which  the  macroeconomic 
variables used by Fischer are not excluded)  aside,  the regressions  (5) and 
(6) in the paper show  that inflation and deficits are negatively  related to 
growth and the ratio of foreign debt to GDP is not significant. Notice that 
the  regressions  reported  include  the  investment  rate as one  of the  ex- 
planatory variables. Thus, the partial correlations between  inflation, defi- 
cits,  or any  other  variable reflect the  effects  of this variable on  growth 
above  and beyond  the effect  that this variable may have  on the invest- 
ment  rate.  In particular, these  correlations  are not  reflecting  crowding 
out phenomena.7 
The deficit variable used  is the average over the period 1975 to 1980, 5 
of the 6 years following  the first oil shock. I would  tend to think that this 
short-run variable is especially  problematic both because  of endogeneity 
and because  it reflects business  cycles rather than long-run  growth  per- 
formance.  If, for instance,  one uses  the Levine and Renelt (1990) central 
government  deficit  as  a ratio to  GDP  for the  period  1974 to  1989 and 
reproduce  regression  (5) using  the  Barro (1991) data set,  one  gets  the 
following: 
GY =  1.50 -  0.51 RGDP70 +  1.71 PRIM70 +  11.8 INV -  1.01 INF 
(-6.2)  (2.5)  (3.6)  (-.94) 
+  .147 SUR -  2.4 LAC -  2.87 SSA 
(3.6)  (-5.0)  (-5.6) 
R2=  0.6,  n=80. 
Paralleling Fischer, the t-statistics in parentheses  have been estimated 
using  White's  (1990)  heteroscedasticity  consistent  covariance  matrix. 
Thus,  the difference  between  regression  (5) in the paper and this one is 
that I use a deficit variable that involves  a larger time span, that I exclude 
the  foreign  debt  variable  (because  it  is  not  significant  in  any  of  the 
regressions  reported  in  the  paper),  and  that  my  sample  size  is  a bit 
larger.8 We see that the coefficients  on initial income,  school enrollment, 
7. This would be exactly true if the data available  reflected  the true investment rate. The 
effects of these variables  on growth once investment is held constant  could reflect  their 
effects on the nonmeasured  part  of investment. 
8. The number of countries for which all the data were available  was 85. To achieve 
comparability  with the equations  I present  below, I use the same sample  of 80 countries. 374 *  SALA-I-MARTIN 
investment, and budget surplus do not change in a significant  manner. 
The coefficient on the inflation rate, however, is no longer significantly 
different  from zero. My conjecture  is, therefore,  that the inflation  rate in 
Fischer's  regression is significant  because it interacts  with the debt vari- 
able in a funny way. 
To see  whether  macroeconomic policy  affects growth directly or 
through the investment rate, Fischer  next presents some evidence on the 
relation between that rate and the macroeconomic  policy variables in 
Table  4.9 The main finding is that the inflation rate is negatively corre- 
lated with the investment ratio and that the black market  premium and 
the average price of investment goods relative  to the United States affect 
investment negatively. Surprisingly,  the surplus variable is negatively 
related to the investment ratio in all regressions. Again this suggests 
that, if we believe that there is a relation between deficits and growth, 
this is not through the crowding out channels suggested by the finite 
horizon theories of the budget deficit. The debt variable  is again insignifi- 
cant in all the equations. 
I do not know why the sample size drops to 40 when the black  market 
premium is  introduced (this change in  sample makes comparisons 
across regressions difficult  to make). I could reproduce  regression  (12)  in 
Fischer's Table 4 using Levine and Renelt's (1990) black market pre- 
mium, and Barro  (1990)  inflation rate for a sample of 80 countries. The 
results are reported in my Table 1. Again, because the debt variable  is 
not significant, I dropped it from the regression. In column one I regress 
the investment ratio to initial GDP,  primary  school enrollment, the infla- 
tion rate, and the government surplus. The first thing to note is that 
neither inflation nor budget surplus is significant  (and the inflation has 
the "wrong" sign). The same is true when I hold constant the African 
and Latin  American dummies in column 2. Hence, changing the defini- 
tion of deficit and excluding the debt variable  substantially  changes the 
9. In some sense we already  know that part  of the effects  do not come through  investment 
given that the regressions reported  by Fischer  have the investment rate as one of the 
explanatory  variables.  If we exclude the investment  rate, Equation  (5) becomes 
GY  =  2.78 -  0.43 RGDP70  + 2.86 PRIM70  + -  0.40 INF + 0.167 SUR -  2.9 LAC 
(-4.9)  (4.6)  (-0.4)  (3.5)  (-5.2) 
-  3.23 SSA. 
(-5.4) 
R2=0.5,  n=80. 
As we can see,  the inflation rate is still insignificant  and the surplus is still significantly 
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results  on the relation between  macro policy and growth  but leaves  the 
rest of the coefficients  unchanged. 
In columns  3 and 4, I follow  Fischer and combine  the macroeconomic 
variables with  the black market premium  (BMP) and the price of invest- 
ment.  Notice  that the number of observations  is 80, about twice as many 
as Fischer's Table 4, column  (12). The two price variables are significantly 
negative  while  the two macro variables are not significant and have the 
"wrong" sign.  The same is true if we hold constant regional dummies  in 
Equation  (4).  The  adjusted  R2 drops  to  0.14  so  the  fraction of  growth 
actually explained  by these variables is rather small. As suggested  by Lee 
(1991), the  relation  between  the  BMP and  the  investment  rate may be 
nonlinear.  In Equation  (5) I exploit  this nonlinear  relation and find that 
the level  of significance  of the BMP variable increases  a lot.  The macro 
variables,  however,  remain insignificant. 
Table  1  CROSS  COUNTRY  INVESTMENT  REGRESSIONS 
Equation 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
RGDP70  .010  .007 
(4.8)  (2.6) 
PRIM70  .101  .097 
(4.6)  (4.6) 
INF  .002  .052  .032  .071  .067 
(.06)  (1.5)  (.92)  (1.9)  (1.8) 
SUR7485  .006  .131  -.085  -.063  -.124 
(.06)  (.81)  (-.7)  (-.4)  (-1.0) 
BMP  -.0004  -.0004 
(-3.6)  (-3.6) 
ln(1 +BMP)  -.018 
(-4.6) 
PINV  -.070  -.049  -.058 
(-3.6)  (-.2)  (-3.6) 
SSA  -.030  -.064 
(-2.7)  (-3.5) 
LAC  -.048  -.058 
(-1.7)  (-3.3) 
R2  .44  .48  .14  .29  .22 
N  80  80  80  80  80 
Notes: The inflation  rate is from Barro (1990), PINV is the value  of the investment  deflator from Barro 
(1991), and SUR7489 (central government  surplus  as a ratio of GDP) and BMP (black market premium) 
are from Levine and Renelt (1990). The values  in parentheses  are t-statistics, which have been calculated 
using White (1980) heteroscedasticity  consistent  covariance matrix. 376  SALA-I-MARTIN 
My reading  of  the  evidence  from this  section  is that the  relation be- 
tween  the  two  macro variables  suggested  in the paper and the growth 
and  investment  rates  is  not  as  clear as Fischer  seems  to  suggest.  The 
relation between  inflation  and growth  is not significant.  Budget deficits 
seem  to affect growth  negatively  but they do not seem  to do so through 
the  normal  channels  of investment  crowding  out.  If anything,  budget 
deficits  seem  to have  a positive  effect  on investment.  The effect of the 
black market  premium  and  the  price  of  investment  goods  seem  a bit 
stronger,  although  I am not sure we  can think of these  two variables as 
intrinsically macroeconomic. 
The final section  of the paper reports the results  of two  case studies: 
one  for Cote d'Ivoire and one  for Chile.  I applaud  the idea of trying to 
find  sources  of  evidence  alternative  to  the  Heston  and  Summers  data 
set,  since  there  are only  so many  regressions  that can be run with  that 
data set,  and  they  seem  to have  been  run already. Case  studies  could 
potentially  be  useful  alternatives.  However,  I would  have  liked  to see 
Fischer's thoughts  on why  and how  these  case studies  can provide  use- 
ful evidence.  As suggested  by the references  to Corden  (1991), it seems 
to me that case studies  end up being used  to compare experiences  across 
countries:  Each of them  ends  up representing  one data point that some 
clever economist  uses  to run a regression  in his head.  If this is the case, 
their  potential  usefulness  will  be  confined  to  being  observations  in  a 
Barro-like cross  country  empirical  study  so  we  are back to  where  we 
started. A second  and perhaps  more serious problem is that case studies 
seem  to be a collection  of facts or stories  organized  according  to some 
prior model.  Hence,  the priors of the researcher will be very important 
in deciding  what  is important  and  what  is not.  In particular, if the re- 
searcher believes  that macroeconomic  policy matters for growth and the 
country  under  study  did  not  grow  much,  the  case  study  is  likely  to 
conclude  that some  macro policy of some  sort went  wrong. 
4. Conclusions 
So  what  did  we  learn?  I  am  not  more  convinced  than  before  that 
macroeconomic  policy  (as defined  by Fischer in the paper) directly mat- 
ters for the  long-run  performance  of countries.  The empirical evidence 
presented  is at best  weak  and  some  of the findings-like,  for example, 
the negative  relation between  growth  and deficits but the positive  rela- 
tion between  investment  and deficits-are  puzzling. 
Even if the correlations  were  robust,  the alternative interpretations  of 
reverse causation and, especially, spurious correlation seem more appeal- 
ing to me.  The most  plausible  interpretation  of the apparent correlation Comment 377 
between  macroeconomic  mismanagement  and  growth  is  that  govern- 
ments  that  do  bad,  do  bad  on  all fronts.  Hence,  even  though  macro- 
economics  does  not matter directly, macroeconomic  variables signal the 
overall performance  of the public sector. 
Does  this  mean  that we  should  not  worry  about  macroeconomics?  I 
think  the  answer  is not  at all.  If one  believes  that,  above  and  beyond 
microeconomic  distortions,  there  is  a  correlation  between  short-run 
macro management  and  long-run  growth,  the main contribution  of the 
paper  is  to bring  attention  to  the  fact that we  do  not  have  theories  to 
explain why  that may be the case. The paper suggests  at least three lines 
of research:  first,  theories  that  explain  qualitatively  and  quantitatively 
the direct effect of inflation and deficits on growth,  without  really affect- 
ing investment.  Second,  (political?) theories that argue that some macro- 
economic  stability is necessary  to implement  the microeconomic  policies 
suggested  by  the  existing  growth  literature.  This is an important  mes- 
sage for growth  theorists  since the value of their policy advice would  be 
zero  if it cannot  really be implemented.  Third, theories  of why  macro- 
economic  variables  may  be  quick  signals  of  microeconomic  trouble.  I 
think that the possibility  of macroeconomic  disarray being a leading  indica- 
tor of long-run  growth  trouble is worth investigating. 
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Discussion 
David Romer suggested  that the simultaneity  bias in the cross-sectional 
regressions  is important.  The likelihood  that poor micro policies and bad 
shocks  are tied with  bad macro policy  means  that identifying  cause and 
effect is difficult.  Further analysis  using  case studies  to sort this issue  is 
needed. 
Robert Barro offered  that while  the individual  variables in the  cross- 
sectional regressions  were not robust, he was not bothered because  they 
should  be thought  of as proxies for a more general effect. After account- 
ing  for initial  income,  modeling  growth  as  converging  to  some  target 
position  is robust.  The variables  Fischer considers  are just further ele- 
ments  in modeling  this  target position.  On a related topic he  doubted 
the  efficacy  of time  series  evidence,  citing  the poor performance  using 
U.S.  data. Fischer responded  by noting  that across countries  one would 
get greater dispersion  in macroeconomic  policies. 
Rodolfo  Manuelli  suggested  that  many  government  policies  work 
through  changing  the  effective  rate of  return.  A  lower  rate of  return 
means  a lower  rate of growth.  He asked whether  one could use this link 
to measure  the  effect  of macro policies  on growth.  Fischer pointed  out 
that there is a set of rates of return in the paper. 
Larry Ball suggested  a couple  of instruments  to sort out the direction 
of causality. One  is some  measure  of central bank independence,  which 
is plausibly  a result  of historical  accident.  A second  set of instruments 
involves  the monetary  regime.  He noted  that the paper points  out that 
many countries  in Africa have low rates of inflation because they are tied 
to the French franc. 
Robert Gordon  asked  what  is the meaning  of the results on the conti- 
nent  dummies.  He  was  struck by the fact that the coefficients  on Latin 
America and Africa are similar as compared  to Asia. Moreover, he asked 
why  Fischer  combines  the  Far-East with  the  subcontinent  countries  of 
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India,  Bangladesh,  and  Pakistan.  Fischer  responded  that  he  was  also 
surprised  that they  were  significant  even  after including  other variables 
one would  think would  account  for them.  In Africa he suggested  that a 
lack of administrative  ability was  partly responsible  and measuring  that 
variable is difficult. Latin America, on the other hand, suffers from politi- 
cal instability. As far as grouping  Asia into one, he stated that India, until 
recently, has been more like the rest of Asia with a higher rate of growth. 
Sweder  van Wijnbergen  commented  that running  total investment  on 
the  government  budget  surplus  was  just  picking  up  the  influence  of 
public investment  on both sides,  and it would  be hard to imagine getting 
anything  but a minus  sign.  He suggested  separating  public and private 
investment.  The results  on the black market premium may involve  mis- 
measured  investment.  A high  black market premium  may mean  that a 
large fraction of investment  is surreptitious. 